The Somali Piracy Problem: A Global Puzzle Necessitating a Global Solution by Sterio, Milena
Cleveland State University 
EngagedScholarship@CSU 
Law Faculty Articles and Essays Faculty Scholarship 
6-2010 
The Somali Piracy Problem: A Global Puzzle Necessitating a 
Global Solution 
Milena Sterio 
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University, m.sterio@csuohio.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_articles 
 Part of the International Law Commons, Law of the Sea Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace 
Commons 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
Repository Citation 
Sterio, Milena, "The Somali Piracy Problem: A Global Puzzle Necessitating a Global Solution" (2010). Law 
Faculty Articles and Essays. 1035. 
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_articles/1035 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Articles and Essays by an authorized administrator of 
EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact research.services@law.csuohio.edu. 
THE SOMALI PIRACY PROBLEM: 

A GLOBAL PUZZLE NECESSITATING 

A GLOBAL SOLUTION 

MILENA STERIO • 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction ....................................................................................... 1450 

I. 	 Prelude: Why Fighting Somali Piracy is Important. ..............1453 

A. 	 Piracy and the Failed Somali State: A Threat to Global 

Peace ................................................................................. 1454 

B. 	 The Economic Costs of Piracy .........................................1455 

C. 	 Piracy as Terrorism: The "Piratization of Terrorism" ....1458 

1. 	 Pirates' political aims ..................................................1458 

2. 	 Somali piracy and terrorism .......................................1459 

3. 	 Piracy as terrorism in international conventions ......1460 

D. 	 Piracy and Deterrence ......................................................1462 

II. 	 Existing Laws Available to Fight Piracy ..................................1463 

A. 	 Domestic Laws ..................................................................1463 

B. 	 International Treaties and Regulations of Piracy ...........1466 

III. 	 Practical Responses to Eliminate Piracy ................................. 14 7 5 

A. 	 State Commitment ........................................................... 14 75 

B. 	 Regional Cooperation ...................................................... 14 77 

C. 	 Capacity Building .............................................................1480 

IV. 	 Solutions for Somalia ..............................................................1482 

A. 	 Legal ..................................................................................1482 

1. 	 Jurisdiction ..................................................................1482 

2. 	 Piracy trials .................................................................. 1485 

B. 	 Practical. ............................................................................1490 

1. 	 Regional cooperation between Somalia and 

neighboring states .......................................................1491 

* Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall CoUege of Law. J.D., Cornell Law 
Schoo~ magna cum Laude, 2002; Maitrise en Droit (French law degree), Universite Paris 
I-Pantheon-Sorbonne, cum Laude, 2002; D.E.A. (master's degree), Private International 
Law, Universite Paris I-Pantheon-Sorbonne, cum Laude, 2003; B.A., Rutgers University, 
French Literature and Political Science, summa cum Laude, 1998. I would like to 
thank Aleksandra Stankovic for her invaluable assistance with the research and 
writing of this article. 
1449 

AMERICAN UNIVERSI1Y LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1449 1450 
2. 	 Improved maritime patrols by major maritime 
powers .......................................................................... 1493 
3. 	 Cost sharing structure between governments and 
shipping companies .................................................... 1495 

Conclusion .......................................................................................... 1496 

INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few years, piracy has exploded off the coast of 
Somalia. Somali pirates congregate on a "mother ship" and then 
divide into smaller groups that sail out on tiny skiffs. 1 Using potent 
weapons such as AK-47s and hand-propelled grenades,2 Somali 
pirates attack civilian ships carrying cargo through the Gulf of Aden, 
a body of water between Yemen and Somalia.3 Once they have 
overtaken the victim vessel, the pirates typically hijack the vessel's 
cargo and kidnap the crewmembers.4 The cargo is often resold to 
willing buyers or held for ransom. 5 The crew are kept hostage in 
Somalia until either the hostages' home country or the shipowners 
pay, at times, multi-million dollar ransoms. 6 In most instances, 
crewmembers are released unharmed,7 but those held hostage have 
described a horrific ordeal.8 The pirates themselves routinely go 
unpunished: once they release the hostages, the pirates simply plan 
yet another lucrative capture. 
The reasons why Somali pirates have a high success rate are 
relatively simple. First, Somali pirates operate mostly in the Gulf of 
1. Todd Pitman, Ending Somali Piracy: Few Options for US Forces, ABC NEWS, Apr. 
14, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Intemational/wireStory?id::73371l4. 
2. Suspected Pirates Rescued in Gulf of Aden, CNN.COM, Dec. 5, 2008, 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/12/04/yemen.pirates/index.html. 
3. Id. The Gulf of Aden is a major international shipping route linking the Red 
Sea and the Arabian Sea. Id. 
4. See generally Eugene Kontorovich, International Legal Responses to Piracy off the 
Coast ofSomalia, ASIL INSIGHTS, Feb. 6, 2009, http:/ /www.asil.org/insights090206.cfm 
(describing the pirates' typical operational style and goals). 
5. 	 Id. 
6. See Vivienne Walt, Why the Somali Pirates Keep Getting Their Ransoms, TIME, Apr. 
20, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/worfd/article/0,8599,1892366,00.html 
(indicating that container ships and tankers can command ransoms upwards of two 
million dollars). 
7. 	 Pitman, supra note 1. 
8. See, e.g., Michael Bahar, Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and Strategi,c 
Theory for Naval Anti-Piracy operations, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 3 (2007) 
(describing the experience of a hijacked ship's crew with Somali pirates); Margaret 
Ryan, Captain Counts the Cost ofPiracy, BBC NEWS, Feb. 2, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4669050.stm (describing an incident where 
pirates set a ship's crew adrift at sea with few rations, and the crew was forced to 
drink their own urine to survive). 
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Aden, a major global shipping route,9 where the number of potential 
targets is higher than elsewhere. Second, Somali pirates are able to 
use the region's geography to their advantage. Somalia has the 
longest coastline in Africa, making it difficult to patrol, and it is 
populated by coastal towns where pirates easily blend in with other 
insurgent groups. 10 Because the Gulf of Aden is a relatively narrow 
body ofwater, pirates are also able to bring smaller ships to land fairly 
quickly, which allows them to secure the crew and cargo while they 
wait for ransom. n Third, Somalia is a failed state with a weak, 
unstable central government and no effective police force; thus, 
pirates are able to operate with impunity from Somali coastal towns. 12 
In fact, news accounts suggest that entire towns on the coast of 
Somalia happily live off the proceeds of piracy. 13 Fourth, piracy is a 
lucrative business: reports indicate that a single seizure of a ship can 
earn each individual pirate up to $150,000. 14 In Somalia, where yearly 
earnings average about $600, this amount is staggering to Somali 
youth who see few other employment options. 15 
Finally, piracy in Somalia is thriving because of a lack of global 
cooperation in suppressing pirate attacks. Pirates work at a 
supranational level: they attack a vessel owned by a company 
headquartered in country A, which flies the flag of country B, and 
employs crewmembers coming from countries C, D, E, and F. 16 Thus, 
no single country's interests are harmed through the pirate attack. 
9. James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Fighting Pirates: The Pen and the Sword, 25 
WORLD PoL'Y J. 41, 41 (noting that 20,000 ships pass through the Gulf of Aden 
annually and that their cargos include twelve percent of the world's daily oil supply). 
10. Pitman, supra note 1. 
11. Id.; see also Kontorovich, supra note 4. 
12. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 52; Death Toll Rises as Violence Rocks Somali 
Capital, CNN.COM, Mar. 11, 2010, 
http:/ /www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/03/l l/somalia.fighting/index.html?ire 
f=allsearch [hereinafter Death Toll Rises] (remarking that Somalia has not had a 
stable government since 1991 and describing the ongoing fighting between 
government and rebel forces); Pitman, supra note 1. 
13. See Mohamed Ahmed, Pirate Stock Exchange Helps Fund Hijackings, FIN. POST 
(Canada), Dec. 1, 2009, http://www.financialpost.com/news­
sectors/story.html?id=2289558 (describing how the pirates have set up "maritime 
companies" in some coastal villages). 
In the exchange towns, local Somalis can invest in the piracy industry by contributing 
money, weapons, or other materials to the pirates. Id. The investor then receives a 
share of the ransom money from successful pirate ventures. Id. 
14. Kontorovich, supra note 4. 
15. Rukmini Callimachi, Seychelles Coast Guard Arrests 9 Suspected Pirates, ABC 
NEWS, Apr. 28, 2009, 
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wirestory?id=7446902&page=2. 
16. See infra note 272 and accompanying text (discussing flags-of-convenience 
and their effect on antipiracy efforts). 
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Moreover, many crewmembers come from the developing world, 17 
and major maritime powers such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom have shown relatively little interest in ransoming pirate-held 
hostages. 18 The lack of global cooperation of law enforcement with 
regard to Somali piracy, combined with the failure to prosecute 
detained pirates, has significantly contributed to Somali pirates' high 
success rates. Even shipping companies, despite being the entities 
most directly affected by pirate attacks, have done little to solve the 
issue. Instead, shipping companies have exacerbated the problem of 
Somali piracy by paying increasingly high ransoms in exchange for 
the release of hijacked ships, cargo, and kidnapped crewmembers. 19 
This Article argues that the true solution to the Somali piracy 
problem consists of a globally coordinated effort involving major 
maritime powers, countries in the regions affected by piracy, and 
shipping companies. This effort would encourage parties to share 
information and jointly collect data, cooperate in maritime patrols 
and surveillance operations off the Somali coast, establish 
jurisdictional networks that ensure pirates are always prosecuted, and 
provide stiff penalties for apprehended pirates. Part I of this Article 
describes why fighting piracy is crucial in today's volatile world. It 
argues that if Somali piracy continues to thrive, it could dangerously 
undermine East African regional stability, contribute to the rise of 
terrorism, further endanger the financial stability of the shipping 
industry, and impose burdensome human and monetary costs on a 
global scale. Even major maritime countries like the United States or 
the United Kingdom could be seriously affected by unchecked piracy 
in Somalia. Part II outlines the existing legal resources available to 
fight piracy, including domestic criminal statutes and major 
international treaties. Part III describes how other regions have 
addressed the problem of modem piracy, focusing on the successful 
solutions adopted by the littoral states in Southeast Asia when piracy 
incidents increased in the Malacca Straits. Finally, Part IV presents 
17. See, e.g., 14 Reasons: Why Ship Owners Prefer Filipino Seafarers and How They 
Exploit Them, MARINEBUZZ.COM, Oct. 30, 2008, 
http:/ /www.marinebuzz.com/2008/l 0/30I14-reasons-why-ship-owners-prefer­
filipino-seafarers-and-how-they-exploit-them/ [hereinafter 14 Reasons] (describing 
why many shipping companies hire crews out of the Philippines). 
18. See Walt, supra note 6 (noting that governments usually do not pay ransoms to 
pirates because (1) shipping or insurance companies will instead; and (2) paying 
ransoms would undermine their anti-pirate military strategies). 
19. James W. Carbin, Pirates: Hostis Humanis Generis, 56 FED. L. 50, 55 (2009) 
(concluding that shipping companies' practice of paying ransoms encourages the 
continuance of piracy). 
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both legal and practical solutions based on the Southeast Asian 
model that could be adopted to resolve the Somali piracy crisis. This 
Article concludes that, because of the potential global threat that 
Somali piracy poses, any response must be global in scope, with all 
affected parties-private and governmental-working both to 
improve security and law enforcement in the affected area and to 
resolve jurisdictional conflicts that inhibit efforts to bring pirates to 
justice. 
I. PRELUDE: WHY FIGHTING SOMALI PIRACY IS IMPORTANT 
According to Captain Pottengal Mukundan, Director of the 
International Maritime Bureau (IMB), piracy in the Gulf of Aden is 
"out of control."20 In 2008, Somali pirates took nearly 600 
crewmembers hostage; several hundred of these crewmembers, as 
well as a dozen ships, are still being held by the pirates, who may 
demand millions of dollars in ransom for their release.21 Somali 
pirates have become more aggressive in their operations, recently 
beginning to attack larger ships. In 2008, they seized the Faina, 
which was carrying Russian tanks and ammunition, as well as the 
supertanker Sirius Star, which was carrying two million barrels of oil. 22 
Section I.A will discuss how, if left unchecked, Somali piracy, in the 
long-term, could eventually lead to the decline of commercial activity 
and commercial centers in East Africa. 23 Section LB will show how 
Somali piracy imposes significant costs on shipping companies that 
are already financially stressed, deterring maritime commerce, 
endangering sea lines of transportation and communication, and 
undermining regional stability.24 
In 2008, the United Nations Security Council, recognizing the 
seriousness of the threat posed by Somali piracy, passed Resolution 
1816, which states that piracy "exacerbate[s] the situation in 
Somalia[,] which continues to constitute a threat to international 
peace and security in the region."25 Section I.C will discuss how 
piracy can both contribute to the formation of maritime terrorism 
20. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 42. 
21. Id. 
22. James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Piracy Repression, Partnering and the Law, 40 J. 
MAR. L. & COM. 43, 43 (2009); see also Walt, supra note 6 (noting that pirates have 
become increasingly skilled at hijacking and that kidnap experts were stunned at the 
seizure of the Sirius Star, whose side had been regarded as too high for pirates to 
scale). 
23. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 43. 
24. Id. at 42-43. 
25. S.C. Res. 1816, 'I[ 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 Uune 2, 2008). 
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and provide funding and other assistance to terrorist causes, aiding 
groups such as al-Qaida. This section will also demonstrate how 
allowing pirates to pursue their activities without resistance sends a 
strong lack-of-deterrence message to other potential sea and land­
based terrorists, who may infer that their efforts will remain 
unchecked for many years as well. 
A. Piracy and the Failed Somali State: A Threat to Global Peace 
Somalia is a failed state.26 Since the early 1990s, Somalia has not 
had a stable government, and its fragile government is currently 
battling warlords and militant Islamic groups for control of the 
country.27 The country does not have a functional economy, and its 
official law enforcement operations are slim, with gangs of 
paramilitary groups and rebel forces controlling the streets of 
Mogadishu and other towns. 28 Piracy has thrived in this cowboy 
culture of inefficient government, and everyday life is ruled by 
violence.29 A functional Somali government is so absent that some 
Somali coastal towns have established pirate-centric societies where 
piracy not only enjoys local support, but local governments rely on 
it.30 If nothing is done to thwart the rise of piracy in Somalia, piracy 
will not only continue to prosper in Somalia, undermining efforts to 
stabilize the country, but also seriously threaten regional and 
international peace and stability. 31 
Piracy can spread elsewhere from Somalia. Other African states, 
whether Somali neighbors or located farther away, could fall prey to 
26. See id. at 52. 
27. Kontorovich, supra note 4 (noting that Somalia has not had a stable 
government since 1991 and lacks the capacity to keep its territorial waters secure); see 
also Jane G. Dalton et al., Introductory Note to United Nations Security Council: Piracy and 
Armed Robbery at Sea-Resolutions 1816, 1846 & 1851, 48 INT'L LEGAL MATTERS 129, 
129 (2009) (attributing the rise in piracy in Somalia to "violent political and 
economic instability, ... the lack of a viable infrastructure to counter lawlessness, 
and the continued proliferation of ever-more-sophisticated small arms and light 
weapons"); Death Toll Rises, supra note 12 (describing ongoing conflicts between the 
government and a militant Islamic group, al-Shabaab). 
28. See Ahmed, supra note 13 (describing the government's lack of control over 
the country and the economic difficulties faced by Somalians); Bahar, supra note 8, 
at 19 (noting that Somalia has no formal maritime defense forces and no effective 
government). 
29. Dalton et al., supra note 27, at 129. 
30. Ahmed, supra note 13 (quoting a local Somali government official who stated 
that "[p]iracy-related business is the main profitable economic activity in our area 
and as locals we depend on their output"). The official described how local districts 
are given a percentage of the pirates' ransom, which they then use to improve 
infrastructure, such as hospitals and schools. Id. 
31. See infra Part I.C (discussing the link between piracy and terrorism) . 
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powerful pirate operations, especially if such operations become 
firmly rooted in Somalia and ruled by powerful warlords enjoying 
Somali government support. Regional pirate networks could be 
created, posing a significant threat to global commerce and human 
safety.32 Moreover, piracy can endanger commercial and tourist 
routes, undermining the regional economy and exposing 
neighboring states to all sorts of potential problems.33 Potential 
problems include economic non-viability, political and civil unrest 
caused by poverty, and border instability provoked by the need to 
expend vast resources on the fight against piracy. In addition, Somali 
piracy can threaten global peace and security if pirates start 
collaborating with other maritime trafficking groups, such as those 
who smuggle narcotics or weapons of mass destruction, either for a 
financial or political cause. Thus, the development of Somali piracy 
could contribute to the spread of maritime violence, endangering sea 
routes everywhere and supporting dangerous factions across the 
globe. 34 As discussed below, the Somali pirates could become linked 
to powerful terrorist organizations and could significantly contribute 
to the development and growth of such groups. These global 
implications, highlighted below, show why a present-day global 
response is needed to curb and eventually eliminate this menace. 
B. The Economic Costs ofPiracy 
As pirate attacks increased over the last few years in the Gulf of 
Aden and elsewhere off the Somali coast, so did shipping companies' 
cargo transportation costs for any ships sailing in these treacherous 
waters. Estimates indicate that shipping companies may be losing 
between thirteen and fifteen billion dollars per year due to pirate 
attacks.35 To minimize the risk of ships falling prey to Somali pirates, 
shipping companies have devoted significant attention to shipping 
routes. In order to avoid the most dangerous places, routes have 
32. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 22, at 43 (arguing that piracy could contribute 
to regional instability in East Africa). 
33. Id. ("Beyond the immediate threat to crews, property, and ships, maritime 
piracy endangers sea lines of communication, interferes with freedom of navigation 
and the free flow of commerce, and undermines regional stability."). 
34. Reports indicate that Somali pirates have broadened the geographical scope 
of their operations from the Gulf of Aden, close to the Somali shore, to Seychelles, 
farther out in the Indian Ocean. Callimachi, supra note 15. 
35. Kraska &Wilson, supra note 9, at 43. 
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sometimes been recalculated and lengthened, thus requiring more 
fuel and more paid days at sea for crewmembers.36 
Moreover, because of the increased risk of pirate attacks off the 
Somali coast, insurance premiums have soared: whereas shippers 
previously paid as little as $500 per voyage, they now face rates as high 
as $20,000 for vessels passing through the pirate-infested waters. 37 
Shipping companies' labor costs have also increased. In light of the 
dangers of the pirate-infested Gulf of Aden, shippers have needed to 
increase crewmembers' salaries to entice them to serve on vessels 
deployed through these waters.38 Even with higher salaries, some 
crewmembers may simply be unwilling to expose their own lives to 
the dangers posed by piracy.39 Thus, recruiting for shipping 
companies may become a difficult exercise, requiring additional 
efforts and expenses. 40 
Finally, in addition to increasing costs on the front-end of the 
shipping process, piracy has driven up costs in other ways. In some 
cases, pirates have demanded multi-million dollar ransoms after 
successfully hijacking a ship and kidnapping its crewmembers, and 
the shipping companies have met those demands in almost every 
instance by paying large sums of cash to the pirates.41 These pirate­
imposed costs have substantially increased shipping companies' 
36. Id. at 42 (indicating that rerouting ships to avoid the Suez Canal and instead 
sail around the Cape of Good Hope would add an additional two weeks to the sea 
voyage, increasing the cost of shipping and the time of transit significantly). 
37. Id. at 43. 
38. Reports indicate that some crewmembers are asking for double pay when 
sailing through pirate-infested waters. The Price of Piracy on Shipping, MARKETPLACE, 
Apr. 10. 2009, 
http:/I marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2009/04/10/ pm_piracy; see also 
14 Reasons, supra note 17 (remarking that shipowners compensate many Filipino 
crewmembers with double pay for the risk of sailing through the Gulf ofAden). 
39. Dan Horlock, Outlook '09: Chemical Shipping Faces Stormy Waters, ICIS.COM,Jan. 
7, 2009, http://www.icis.com/Articles/2009/01/07/9182084/outlook--09-chemical­
shipping-faces-stormy-waters.html (discussing how piracy has exacerbated the pre­
existing problem of qualified crew shortages in certain areas of the shipping 
industry). 
40. Baird Maritime, InterManager: Criminalisation and Piracy Damage Seafarer 
Recruitment, Mar. 22, 2010, 
http:/ /www.bairdmaritime.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6 
004:intermanager-criminalisation-and-piracy-damage-seafarer­
recrui tment&catid= l l 3:ports-and-shipping&Itemid=208. 
41. Carbin, supra note 19, at 54 (speculating that ransoms paid to date will soon 
reach the amount of $50 million dollars). One reason the pirates have been so 
successful at obtaining large ransom payments is that the pirates have been careful 
not to damage hijacked vessels and cargo or to injure hostages so that they can use 
these assets as leverage. Id. 
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expenses and could cause significant long-term economic problems 
in the shipping industry if piracy in Somalia is not addressed.42 
The financial problems that Somali pirates have brought upon 
shipping companies are particularly relevant in light of the ongoing 
global financial crisis.43 According to one recent analysis, 
"[i]nstability from maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden is sending 
ripples throughout the global supply chain, which is already reeling 
from the collapse of shipping rates brought on by the worldwide 
economic slowdown. "44 As the economic crisis has peaked, 
consumption has declined, demand for merchandise and raw 
materials has dropped, and fewer ships are needed to transport 
goods. The result has been a decrease in shipping prices and lower 
profits for shipping companies.45 Moreover, shipping companies' 
abilities to borrow money and work closely with large lenders may 
have been negatively affected by the banking crisis.46 A significant 
decline in existing cash flows coupled with the need to expend large 
sums of cash to pay pirate ransoms may wreak havoc on shipping 
companies' finances and may threaten their long-term financial 
stability. In addition, the financial strain of increasing global fuel 
costs is exacerbated by the need to purchase additional fuel to avoid 
pirate-infested shipping routes.47 Finally, if shipping companies are 
forced to incur additional expenses to equip their ships with security 
officers, weapons, pirate-tracking devices, and other technological 
mechanisms to combat pirates, their financial future and well-being 
in today's volatile economy may become uncertain. 
42. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 22, at 46 (explaining that, in addition to pirate­
imposed costs and safety concerns, the shipping industry also faces unpredictable 
fuel costs, skyrocketing insurance premiums, decreasing freight rates, and increasing 
safety concerns for crew and cargo). 
43. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 41. 
44. Id. 
45. See Thomas Shulz, That Sinking Feeling: Global Crisis Hits Shipping Industry 
Hard, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Dec. 5, 2008, 
http:/ /www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,594 710,00.html. 
46. Id. (describing how banks' reluctance to issue loans and letters of credit is 
impacting shipping companies); Alexander Jung et al., The Container Crisis: Shipping 
Industry Fights for Survival, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Aug. 11, 2009, 
http:/ /www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,641513,00.html (noting that 
the shipping industry declined by sixteen percent in six months). 
47. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 43. 
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C. Piracy as Terrorism: The "Piratization ofTerrorism"18 
Some modern-day pirates, including some operating in Somalia, 
are more akin to sea-terrorists than sea-robbers. While contemporary 
pirate activity, like medieval piracy, may be fueled partially by the 
prospect of significant financial gain, some modern pirates resort to 
violence because of political and ideological goals.49 
1. Pirates' political aims 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, when piracy was thriving in the 
Malacca Straits of Southeast Asia, reports indicated that pirates 
operated off an Indonesian island where the Aceh separatist group 
was fighting for autonomy and independence from Indonesia.50 
Some pirates were members of Aceh, while others received support 
from Aceh. It is widely believed that piracy proceeds fueled the Aceh 
separatist movement by providing the group with the funds necessary 
to purchase weapons, train military groups, and engage in violent 
secessionist combat. 51 Southeast Asia is also home to other violent 
Islamic groups, such as the Jemaah Islamiya and the Mumpulan 
Mujahideen in Malaysia; the Moro National Liberation Front, the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines; 
and Laskar Jihad in Indonesia.52 Some of these groups have 
considered launching attacks against vessels in the Strait of Malacca.53 
Others have already launched attacks: the Indonesian Aceh rebels 
hijacked an oil tanker in 2003; Abu Sayyaf has abducted foreigners 
from resorts by boat, transporting them to the Philippines where they 
then demand multi-million dollar ransoms; and ethnic Malay groups 
have become increasingly interested in learning hijacking 
techniques.54 In sum, IMB has reported the emergence of a "new 
brand of piracy" in Southeast Asia, one where attacks are motivated 
by overarching political goals and where ransoms are used to finance 
48. I respectfully borrow the term "piratization of terrorism" from Michael 
Bahar. See Bahar, supra note 8, at 28. 
49. Erik Barrios, Note, Casting a Wider Net: Addressing the Maritime Piracy Prob"fem in 
Southeast Asia, 28 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 149, 151 (2005). 
50. Bahar, supra note 8, at 29 (describing how the Free Aceh Movement in 
Indonesia has been linked to maritime terrorism). 
51. See Id. (describing pirate attacks committed by the Free Aceh Movement in 
the Strait of Malacca between 2002 and 2003); see al,so Aceh Rebel,s Blamed for Piracy, 
BBC, Sept. 8, 2003, http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3090136.stm. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Niclas Dahlvang, Thieves, Robbers, & Terrorists: Piracy in the 21st Century, 4 
REGENT]. INT'L L. 17, 33-34 (2006). 
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politically related terrorist activity rather than to provide personal 
financial gain.55 
There is also some concern that terrorist groups could engage in 
pirate-like hijackings to carry out terror attacks. One author notes: 
Actual attacks by terrorists have thus far been limited to temporary 
seizures of vessels and crewmen, but officials express concern over 
the ease with which large vessels such as oil tankers could be 
hijacked and used as weapons with which to block commercial 
waterways or attack one of Southeast Asia's numerous busy harbors. 
In addition to direct attacks, terrorists may also exploit the region's 
maritime shipping activity to facilitate their operations in other 
parts of the world. For example, authorities suspect that terrorist 
groups have been using container ships to smuggle weapons, 
supplies, and even the terrorists themselves.56 
Somalia provides fertile ground for piracy and terrorism to merge. 
2. Somali piracy and terrorism 
The "piratization of terrorism," which is already a significant worry 
in Southeast Asia, could easily spread to Somalia, where Osama bin 
Laden is believed to have militant training bases, and where militant 
factions linked to al-Qaida operate freely. 57 Terrorism already has a 
foothold in the country; for example, authorities believe that a 
militant Islamist rebel group carried out a recent terrorist attack that 
left twenty-three people dead at a medical school graduation in 
Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia.58 This type of violence exemplifies 
Somalia's volatility, vulnerability to militant Islamic groups, and the 
ability of terrorist groups to function with impunity. Similarly, pirates 
have been able to operate without repercussions. If not kept in 
check, Somali pirates could forge allegiances with terrorist groups 
interested in attacking in Somalia or elsewhere in the world. 
Outside Somalia, some modern-day pirate organizations are akin to 
sea-terrorists because they have direct ties to terrorist groups. 59 
Pirates have smuggled weapons and delivered them to terrorist 
55. Barrios, supra note 49, at 151. 
56. Id. (citations omitted). 
57. Bahar, supra note 8, at 28; Death Toll Rises, supra note 13 (linking a local 
militant Islamic group, al-Shabaab, to al-Qaida). 
58. Somalia Graduation Ceremony Blast Kills 23, CNN.COM, Dec. 4, 2009, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/12/04/somalia.attacks/index.html 
(reporting that the attack was attributed to al-Shabaab). 
59. See, e.g., Dahlvang, supra note 54, at 18 (arguing that the profits realized by 
piracy may subsidize terrorism). 
1460 AMERICAN UNIVERSI1Y LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1449 
60 61 groups and have financially contributed to such groups. Modern 
pirates are not sympathetic Robin Hoods of the sea; rather, they are 
maritime terrorists linked to powerful groups like al-Qaida and the 
Aceh, engaged in a form of sea aggression to terrorize shippers and 
govemments.62 Al-Qaida, for example, has used vessels filled with 
explosives to attack ships from major maritime powers, such as the 
United States and France.63 Osama bin Laden, who allegedly owns or 
controls almost twenty freighters known as the "al Qaeda Navy," has 
shown how terrorists can utilize the seas: a bin Laden-controlled 
merchant ship delivered the explosives that were used to bomb 
American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.64 
Modern pirates are also similar to terrorists because they function 
on a highly organized scale at a supranational level. The Southeast 
Asian pirates have not confined their attacks to ships from their 
countries of residence; rather, they have targeted cargo ships from a 
variety of nations, taken hostage nationals of many different states, 
and demanded ransom from all of these governments.65 Similarly, 
Somali pirates have engaged in indiscriminate attacks against a 
variety of nations' ships, likewise taking hostages from numerous 
countries and demanding ransoms from their governments.66 
Moreover, modem pirates function in a hierarchical, organized 
fashion. Reports on Somali piracy indicate that their operations are 
managed by powerful warlords who live in impunity on the Somali 
mainland; the attacks are executed by young men who are recruited 
from the poverty-stricken streets in coastal villages and towns. 67 
Similarly, powerful leaders, like Osama bin Laden, lead terrorist 
organizations, often hiding in lawless regions or geographically 
60. Id. at 31-32 (describing how terrorist organizations use ships flying flags-of­
convenience to transport weapons and explosives, some ofwhich have been linked to 
terrorist attacks such as the Bali nightclub bombings of 2002). 
61. Id. at 31-34 (detailing instances of pirate attacks linked to terrorist groups 
and pointing out that piracy can be used to fund terrorism). 
62. Dahlvang, supra note 54, at 31-32, 34 (describing Osama bin Laden's "navy" 
and a 2003 oil tanker hijacking linked to Aceh). 
63. See George D. Gabel, Jr., Smoother Seas Ahead: The Draft Guidelines as an 
International Solution to Modem-Day Piracy, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1433, 1437-38 (2007) 
(describing al-Qaida attacks on a U.S. ship in 2000 and on a French ship in 2002). 
64. Id. at 1438. 
65. See, e.g., Dahlvang, supra note 54, at 31-34 (detailing instances of pirate 
attacks in Southeast Asia against ships coming from different nations). 
66. Bahar, supra note 8, at 36. 
67. When ten suspected Somali pirates were apprehended after the attack on the 
Safina al Bisrat in 2006, it was discovered that they did not know their birthdays, their 
parents, or how to read and write, and some were very young. Id. at 41; see also 
Ahmed, supra note 13 (providing a specific example of how Somalia's impoverished 
state drove a young man to piracy). 
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inhospitable areas, while terrorist attacks are virtually always executed 
by young men recruited by the terrorist group in a systematic, 
carefully planned manner. 68 In addition, both modern-day pirates 
and terrorist groups may bribe government officials to gain valuable 
information, which they use to prepare attacks.69 
3. Piracy as terrorism in international conventions 
Some scholars support the view that the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), negotiated in 1982, 
embraces acts commonly considered terrorism as piracy.70 UNCLOS 
defines piracy as a violent act committed "for private aims."71 Other 
scholars argue that this provision simply excludes state-sponsored 
piracy from the convention and does not eliminate acts committed 
for a political purpose (such as the acts of a terrorist group) from 
qualifying as piracy.12 In other words, just because terrorists have 
some political goals, their actions also consist of at least some private 
ends that would bring maritime terrorists within the definition of 
piracy under UNCLOS.73 Moreover, as long as maritime terrorists 
attack indiscriminately against several states, they remain hostis 
humani generi and should be treated as pirates under UNCLOS.74 
Although many scholars contend that acts of terrorism do not qualify 
as piracy under UNCLOS because they are not committed for private 
but rather for political aims, recent scholarly support exists for the 
68. See generally Thomas M. Sanderson, Transnational Terror and Organized Crime: 
Blurring the Lines, 24 SAIS REV. 49 (2004) (analyzing the relationship between 
organized crime and terrorism). 
69. See Scott Baldauf, Who are Somalia's Pirates?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 
20, 2008 http:/ /www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2008/l 120/p25s22-woaf.html 
(discussing how corrupt government officials aid Somali pirates); David M. Luna, 
Dir. for Anticrime Programs, Bureau of Int'! Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
Remarks at APEC Anticorruption Meeting (Feb. 26, 2009) (discussing how 
corruption contributes to the success of international criminal organizations). 
70. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101, Oct. 7, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 41-42 [hereinafter UNCLOS] (including "acts of violence" and 
"detention" in the definition of piracy); Bahar, supra note 8, at 34-37 (demonstrating 
through analysis of various acts of terrorism on vessels that the private ends sought by 
the terrorists do not prevent these acts from being classified and prosecuted as 
piracy). 
71. UNCLOS, supra note 70; see also infra Part II.B (discussing the private aims 
requirement under UNCLOS). 
72. See Bahar, supra note 8, at 28-35 (arguing that as long as terrorists are not 
direct state actors and they strike in international waters, they should be viewed as 
pirates, regardless of their subjective intent). 
73. Id. at 33. 
74. Id. 
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alternative proposition-that maritime terrorism represents a form of 
piracy under UNCLOS.75 
The Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention)-negotiated in 
1988 in direct response to a maritime hijacking of an Italian cruise 
ship by members of a Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 
faction-is an anti-terrorist convention listed as such on the United 
Nations website and drafted as such for jurisdictional purposes. 76 The 
PLO attack epitomized the concept of piracy as maritime terrorism 
after the United States decried the act as piracy.77 The SUA 
Convention solidifies the idea of universal jurisdiction by authorizing 
any nation to pursue an attacking vessel, as long as the vessel is in 
some form of international transit, and to prosecute offenders.78 
Finally, the SUA Convention, although applicable to most modern­
day incidents of piracy, does not speak directly of piracy. Rather, it 
simply outlaws several different types of maritime aggression, for 
example: hijacking a ship, taking crew members or passengers 
hostage, or planting explosives on a ship.79 The SUA Convention 
illustrates the modern-day approach to piracy and the need to 
broaden its definition to encompass maritime aggression and 
terrorism, as opposed to confining its definition to the out-dated 
scope of sea-robbery. 
75. For the traditional view that UNCLOS excludes acts of terrorism from its 
definition of piracy, see Barrios, supra note 49, at 156; Tina Garmon, International 
Law of the Sea: Reconciling the Law of Piracy and Terrorism in the Wake of September 11th, 
27 TUL. MAR. LJ. 257, 274 (2002); Zou Keyuan, Implementing the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea in East Asia: Issues and Trends, 9 SING. Y.B. INT'L L. 37, 
44 (2005). For the modem view that UNCLOS does not exclude acts of terrorism 
from iL~ definition of piracy, see Bahar, supra note 8, at 27-28; Malvina Halberstam, 
Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO Convention of Maritime 
Safety, 
82 AM.J. INT'LL. 269, 282 (1988). 
76. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation art. 3, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinanfter SUA 
Convention] (defining the "offense" as a number of different acts that could be 
terrorism or piracy, and not limiting the offense to the customary definition of 
piracy); Malvina Halberstam, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Comments at the 
American Society of International Law Annual Meeting (Mar. 26, 2009) [hereinafter 
ASIL Meeting] (describing the events leading up to the passage of the SUA 
Convention and how the SUA Convention addressed the antiterrorism concerns 
posed by the Achille Lauro incident). 
77. Bahar, supra note 8, at 27-28. 
78. SUA Convention, supra note 76, art. 3. 
79. Id. 
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D. Piracy and Deterrence 
Piracy is a serious criminal activity. Pirates are criminal offenders 
subject to universal jurisdiction;80 from a deterrence standpoint, not 
fighting them sends the wrong message to pirates and other criminal 
and terrorist organizations. This is particularly true if pirates are 
routinely released after capture, or if only a few of those captured are 
prosecuted. While deterrence is essential in the fight against piracy, 
it is difficult to judge how efficacious prosecutions would be to deter 
the spread of Somali piracy. Young men living in poverty on the 
Somali coast may not be deterred at all by the possibility of facing 
legal consequences when considering whether to become a pirate. 
For poor Somali youth, the prospect of earning thousands of dollars 
may outweigh the unlikely possibility of being caught and tried.81 
While deterrence alone may not solve the Somali pirate problem, it 
remains an important part of the solution. 
Deterrence of Somali pirates through criminal prosecutions 
remains important for several reasons. From a local Somali 
standpoint, if prospective pirates believe the chances of capture and 
prosecution significantly outweigh the probability of profit, then 
there is a possibility that more recruits would be dissuaded from 
engaging in this criminal activity.82 Moreover, if international 
criminals such as pirates are not routinely prosecuted and punished, 
other potential criminals, such as weapons-smugglers and narco­
traffickers, may think that hard-to-prosecute crimes routinely go 
unpunished and that they may flout international law with impunity.83 
This may lead to an overall increase in international crime. Thus, 
pirates should be fought, captured, and routinely prosecuted because 
the whole world has an interest in deterring international crimes. 
II. EXISTING LAWS AVAILABLE TO FIGHT PIRACY 
While the previous section showed why prosecuting pirates is 
necessary, this section will argue that the fight against piracy needs to 
80. UNCLOS, supra note 70, art. 101. 
81. See Bahar, supra note 8, at 41 (illustrating the dire circumstances under which 
the Somali pirates have matured). 
82. See id. (arguing that the perceived probability of capture will likely have a 
deterrent effect on the Somali pirates). 
83. See MICHAEL BRAUN, WASH. INSTIT. FOR NEAR E. POLICY, COUNTERING 
TRANSNATIONAL THREATS: TERRORISM, NARCO-TRAFFICKING, AND WMD PROLIFERATION 
(POLICY Focus No. 92) 27, 27-29 (Mathew Levitt & Michael Jacobson eds., 2009) 
(highlighting the symbiotic relationship between terrorism and terrorist 
organizations and narco-trafficking and arms dealing). 
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be grounded in the law: states active in fighting pirates and 
interested in prosecuting them in domestic courts need to rely on 
domestic and international laws in order to justify antipiracy 
operations.84 The section below outlines the domestic antipiracy laws 
of some of the most important countries in the global piracy fight, as 
well as the most important international laws and regulations 
applicable to piracy. 
A. Domestic Laws 
The United States has a long history of punishing acts of piracy, 
but in some respects it has failed to modernize its piracy law. The 
U.S. Constitution defines piracy as an act that occurs on the high 
seas.
85 Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the 
power "[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on 
the high seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations."86 Congress, 
pursuant to such direct constitutional authority, enacted 18 U.S.C. § 
1651, which provides that "[w]hoever, on the high seas, commits the 
crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards 
brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for 
life."87 The U.S. Supreme Court has further expounded the 
definition of piracy, specifying that an act can come within the scope 
of piracy even though the actors did not intend to plunder, or did 
not engage in plunder.88 According to the Supreme Court, if 
someone "sinks or destroys an innocent merchant ship, without any 
other object than to gratify his lawless appetite for mischief," the act 
may qualify as piracy, like an act of robbery on the high seas.89 In the 
United States, however, maritime law fails to address modern-day 
issues of piracy, such as when acts are committed for a political end 
or in support of terrorism.90 
In the Marine Insurance Act of 1906, Great Britain defined pirates 
as "passengers who mutiny and rioters who attack the ship from the 
shore."91 Prior to this, British common law viewed piracy as acts of 
depredation and robbery committed on the high seas, which, if 
84. See Bahar, supra note 8, at 40-43. 
85. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10. 
86. Id. 
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006); see also id.§§ 1652-1653 (prescribing life sentences 
for pirates who are aliens and United States citizens); 33 U.S.C. §§ 381-384 (2006) 
(authorizing the use of private and public vessels to combat and seize pirate ships). 
88. United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232 (1844). 
89. Id. 
90. Gabel, supra note 63, at 1444. 
91. Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 41, § 30, sched. 1, 11 8. 
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committed on land, would have amounted to a felony.92 Kenya, a 
regional partner in the fight against Somali piracy, adapted its law 
from British common law and has already tried some of the captured 
Somali pirates.93 Kenya defined a pirate as "[a]ny person who, in 
territorial waters or upon the high seas, commits any act of piracy 
• • • ,,94JUre gentnum. 
Southeast Asian countries have also struggled with finding a 
suitable definition of the act of piracy. The Philippines, an important 
partner in the fight against Southeast Asian piracy, defines the activity 
as "[a]ny attack upon a seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the 
whole or part thereof. . . by means of violence against or 
intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any 
person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said 
vessel, in Philippine waters."95 Malaysia, another country battling 
Southeast Asian piracy, defines piracy as an act committed "by any 
person on the high seas where the offense is piracy by the law of 
nations."96 The High Court of Malaysia has jurisdiction to try all 
offenses that are committed within its own jurisdiction, onboard a 
Malaysia-flagged vessel on the high seas, or by any Malaysia citizen or 
resident on the high seas.97 
It is interesting to note the discrepancy in the definitions of piracy 
in the above domestic laws. In the United States, Great Britain, and 
Malaysia, an act must be committed on the high seas in order to 
qualify as piracy; in Kenya, a prosecutable act of piracy can be 
committed either in territorial waters or on the high seas;98 and in the 
Philippines, the piratical act must be committed in Philippine waters 
in order to constitute piracy.99 Moreover, the laws of the United 
States, Kenya, and Malaysia define piracy by referring to the law of 
nations: under these countries' domestic laws, an act must constitute 
piracy under international law first to be criminalized as piracy under 
92. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 499 (John Bethune Bayly, ed., 
Saunders and Benning 1840). 
93. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 46; see also Lawrence Azubuike, International 
Law Regime Against Piracy, 15 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 43, 55 (2009). 
94. The Penal Code, (1967) Cap. 63 § 69 (Kenya). 
95. Antipiracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law ofl974, Pres. Dec. No. 532, § 2(d) 
(1974), (Phil.), availabk at 
http://www.asianlii.org/ph/legis/pres_decree/pdn532181/. 
96. Courts ofJudicature Act, (1964) § 22(l)(a)(iv) (Malay.). 
97. Id. 
98. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
99. See supra text accompanying notes 87-97 (listing the different statutory 
requirements for piracy in different countries that have dealt with piracy). 
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domestic law. 100 The piracy laws of Great Britain and the Philippines, 
however, do not contain any such references to the law of nations. 101 
Thus, an additional hurdle in the global fight against piracy may be 
found in the dissimilarities among the various countries' definitions 
of piracy. For example, an act committed on the high seas may 
qualify as piracy for most countries, but if the offenders or victims are 
from the Philippines and if the Philippines are viewed as a logical 
prosecution forum for that reason, the offenders may not be 
prosecuted at all because the act was not committed in the Philippine 
territorial waters. 102 Nations who captured the offenders may not be 
able to transfer them to the Philippines for prosecution and may 
simply have to release captured pirates for a lack of another option. 103 
While the discrepancies among maritime nations' piracy laws are 
important, and may sometimes impede the fight against piracy, piracy 
is also the subject of several international treaties and regulations that 
offer a more uniform definition than the domestic laws. These 
treaties and regulations will be addressed in the following section. 
B. International Treaties and Reg;ulations ofPiracy 
Article 15 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas (Convention 
on the High Seas) and Article 101 of UNCLOS101 both contain the 
most universally accepted definition of piracy: 
(1) Any illegal act of violence, detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a 
private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (a) On the high 
seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property 
on board such ship or aircraft; (b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons 
or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State.100 
100. See supra text accompanying notes 87-97 (highlighting the similarities in 
antipiracy Jaws in the United States, Kenya, and Malaysia). 
101. See supra text accompanying notes 87-97 (differentiating the piracy laws of 
Great Britain and the Philippines from the applicable statutory requirements in 
other countries). 
102. See Azubuike, supra note 94, at 50 (limiting universal jurisdiction to 
international waters more than twelve nautical miles off the coast of the country). 
103. SeeAntipiracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974, Pres. Dec. No. 532, § 
2(d) (1974), (Phil.), available at 
http:/ /www.asianlii.org/ph/legis/pres_decree/pdn532181/ (limiting the definition 
of piracy to events that take place in Philippine waters, and not authorizing 
prosecution for criminals caught on the high seas). 
104. UNCLOS, supra note 70, art. 101; United Nations Convention on the High 
Seas art. 15, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11, 90 [hereinafter Convention on the High 
Seas]. 
105. UNCLOS, supra note 70, art. 101; Convention on the High Seas, supra note 
104, art. 15. 
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While some scholars have criticized the restrictive nature of the 
piracy definition in the Convention on the High Seas and UNCLOS, 
arguing that the two treaties actually narrowed the scope of piracy 
from its roots in customary law,106 most agree that the above 
definition reflects international custom as it stands today. 107 
The Convention on the High Seas/UNCLOS definition of piracy is 
restrictive for several reasons. First, the definition requires that the 
violent act be committed for private aims. 108 Although some scholars 
believe that the private aims requirement is intended to eliminate 
conduct committed on behalf of states or by state actors from the 
definition of piracy, 109 other scholars argue that this requirement 
disqualifies acts committed for political and ideological reasons from 
being considered piracy. 110 These scholars suggest that an act of 
maritime terrorism committed to advance the political goals of a 
group, like al-Qaida or the PLO, may not qualify as piracy under the 
Convention on the High Seas/UNCLOS definition. 111 Second, the 
above piracy definition requires that the violent act be committed on 
the high seas. 112 The reasons for this limitation are logical: under 
traditional international law, anything that happens within the 
territorial sovereignl)'. of a given state is a matter for that state alone 
to address and rectify. 113 Because the crime of piracy is closely linked 
106. See, e.g., Barrios, supra note 49, at 161 (arguing that under customary 
international law, piracy was more broadly defined than the narrow definition 
enshrined in UNCLOS). 
107. Jon D. Peppetti, Building the Global Maritime Security Network: A Multinational 
Legal Structure to Combat Transnational Threats, 55 NAVAL L. REV. 73, 92 (2008). 
108. UNCLOS, supra note 70, art. 101; Convention on the High Seas, supra note 
104, art. 15. 
109. See, e.g., Bahar, supra note 8, at 27 ("Unless ... terrorists were commissioned 
by a state, they are private actors."); see also id. at 27-37 (discussing in detail why acts 
committed by terrorists can qualify as piracy). 
110. Peppetti, supra note 107, at 92 (arguing that the private ends restriction has 
contributed to the most commonly adopted view that acts of violence committed for 
religious, ethnic, or political reasons, such as acts of maritime terrorism, cannot be 
treated as piracy); see also supra Part I.C (utilizing the piracy issues in the Malacca 
Straits of Indonesia, and other areas to explain the "piratization of terrorism" and 
how the international community is attempting to fight this form of globalized, 
politicized crime). 
111. Azubuike, supra note 94, at 52 (noting that the commonly held view is that 
acts of violence committed on religious, ethnic, or political grounds cannot be 
treated as piracy). 
112. Under UNCLOS, the area comprised of twelve miles into the sea from the 
coastline of the littoral state constitutes the littoral state's territorial waters; any areas 
beyond the territorial waters are considered part of the high seas. UNCLOS, supra 
note 70, art. 3; see also Azubuike, supra note 93, at 50 (articulating the 12 nautical 
mile requirements of UNCLOS and noting that up to 200 nautical miles may be 
claimed by the mainland country as an economic zone). 
113. Bahar, supra note 8, at 18. 
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to the idea of universal jurisdiction, if the scope of piracy extends 
into a state's territorial waters, the universality of the crime collides 
with the territorial sovereignty of that state. 114 Therefore, the high 
seas requirement for piracy is rational from an international law 
. 115
standpomt. 
While this may be true, the high seas requirement nonetheless 
disqualifies many acts of maritime violence from the definition of 
piracy. For example, if Somali pirates strike within the twelve­
nautical-mile territorial sea of their home country, this act would not 
constitute piracy under the Convention on the High Seas/UNCLOS 
definition. 116 Consequently, the Convention on the High 
Seas/UNCLOS jurisdictional regimes, which provide any nation 
interested in capturing pirates with the possibility of extending 
universal jurisdiction over such captured pirates, are not useful in the 
Somali context. 
Another limiting factor is that the Convention on the High 
Seas/UNCLOS piracy definition requires the presence of two vessels 
for an act to qualify as piracy-an aggressor vessel must attack a 
victim vessel. Therefore, if hijackers board the victim vessel at its last 
port of entry and then overpower the ship's crew on the high seas, 
this act would not constitute piracy under the Convention on the 
High Seas/UNCLOS definition, because only one vessel is involved. 117 
While some scholars have argued that two vessels may not be 
required under the Convention on the High Seas/UNCLOS 
definition, 118 the majority view and the plain reading of these 
conventions indicate that their drafters envision the presence of two 
vessels in their definition of piracy. 119 Overall, the Convention on the 
High Seas and UNCLOS codify the law of piracy narrowly, perhaps 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Peppetti, supra note 107, at 92-93. 
117. Halberstam, supra note 76 (reasoning that universal jurisdiction on the high 
seas makes sense because the coastal state only has an interest in protecting its home 
waters). 
118. See Bahar, supra note 8, at 38-39 (arguing that UNCLOS drafters merely 
intended to exclude from the definition of piracy "criminal acts by one passenger or 
crewmember against another" and also arguing that case law on piracy does not 
support a two-ship requirement). 
119. See, e.g., Azubuike, supra note 93, at 53 (explaining that the two-ship 
requirement is reasonable because it "emanates from the notion that a ship [being 
attacked] is always under the jurisdiction of the flag State," so that "any act or offense 
committed on board [that] ship is subject to the domestic laws of the flag State"); see 
also UNCLOS, supra note 70, art. 101 (providing that piracy consists of violent acts 
committed "by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft" 
directed "against another ship or aircraft") (emphasis added). 
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regrettably eliminating a multitude of acts of maritime aggression 
from the definition of piracy. 
In addition to limiting the definition of piracy, the Convention on 
the High Seas and UNCLOS impose restrictions on states' ability to 
capture and prosecute pirates. The conventions provide that any 
state has jurisdiction to capture pirates on the high seas, as follows: 
"On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of 
any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship 
taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the 
persons and seize the property on board."120 The concept of universal 
jurisdiction over pirates is limited to the high seas, as these 
conventions do not authorize nations to pursue pirates in a state's 
territorial waters. 121 
These conventions further state that the capturing nation may then 
prosecute pirates in its domestic courts. Article 19 of the Convention 
on the High Seas and Article 105 of UNCLOS provide: "The courts 
of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the 
penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be 
taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the 
rights of third parties acting in good faith." 122 Under these 
conventions, however, the capturing nation may not transfer seized 
pirates to a third country for prosecution. 123 The idea of universal 
jurisdiction, therefore, gives limited options to piracy-fighting states, 
as their authority to pursue pirates ceases to exist outside the high 
seas, and the opportunity to prosecute pirates arises only in cases 
where the capturing state is also willing to prosecute.124 
120. UNCLOS, supra note 70, art. 105; Convention on the High Seas, supra note 
104, art. 19. 
121. UNCLOS defines the limit of territorial sea to twelve nautical miles offshore. 
UNCLOS, supra note 70, art. 3. Some nations, however, have taken a more 
aggressive approach in claiming that their exclusive economic zones, which typically 
extend out to 200 nautical miles, constitute territorial waters. See Dahlvang, supra 
note 54, at 24 (explaining that China claims 200 nautical miles off its coast as the 
area where the mainland has jurisdiction). 
122. UNCLOS, supra note 70, art. 105; Convention on the High Seas, supra note 
104, art. 19. 
123. This conclusion follows from a close reading of the Convention on the High 
Seas and UNCLOS, and many scholars have embraced it. See, e.g., Kontorovich, supra 
note 4 (relating the history of article 105 of UNCLOS, which does not allow a 
transfer of captured pirates to third parties for prosecution, and comparing that 
provision to the SUA Convention). 
124. Note, however, that some scholars have argued that the Convention on the 
High Seas and UNCLOS do not prohibit a noncapturing state from prosecuting 
seized pirates. See, e.g., Azubuike, supra note 93, at 54-55 (arguing that the 
jurisdiction of the capturing state is not exclusive but merely permissive because 
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If an act of maritime violence does not fall within the scope of the 
Convention on the High Seas/UNCLOS, the perpetrators cannot be 
apprehended or prosecuted under these conventions' jurisdictional 
basis. Consequently, countries willing to capture, detain, and 
prosecute violent maritime offenders may be forced to look to other 
laws in order to justify their anti-piracy operations. 
Whereas the Convention on the High Seas/UNCLOS provisions 
sometimes leave gaps with regard to the capture and prosecution of 
pirates, the SUA Convention attempts to aid states in their fight 
against maritime violence by broadening the jurisdictional basis for 
the capture and prosecution of maritime aggressors. 125 The SUA 
Convention is considered an anti-terrorist treaty, and rather than 
defining piracy, it lists a series of maritime criminal offenses that are 
prohibited under the convention. 126 The list includes the following 
acts that, if committed, would likely endanger the safe navigation of 
the vessel: seizing or taking control of a ship by force or the threat of 
force, performing an act of violence against a person on board a ship, 
destroying or damaging a ship or its cargo, placing devices or 
substances on a ship that are likely to destroy that ship, knowingly 
communicating false information to a ship, and injuring or killing 
any person in connection with any of the above acts. 127 
The SUA Convention does away with the restrictive elements of the 
Convention on the High Seas/UNCLOS definition of piracy. First, 
the SUA Convention does not have the private aims requirement of 
the Convention on the High Seas/UNCLOS treaties; thus, maritime 
terrorist acts driven by politics and ideology, and not simply private 
aims, would fall within the SUA Convention framework. 128 Second, 
the SUA Convention authorizes states to pursue maritime aggressors 
not only on the high seas, but anytime the victim vessel is in some 
customary law provided for universal jurisdiction over pirates and UNCLOS codified 
customary law). 
125. SUA Convention, supra note 76, art. 4. 
126. Ratifying nations consider the SUA convention to be an antiterrorist 
convention. Bob Beckman, Comments at the American Society of International Law 
Annual Meeting (Mar. 26, 2009); see also Dahlvang, supra note 54, at 23 (noting that 
the SUA Convention does not refer to piracy by name). 
127. SUA Convention, supra note 76, art. 4. 
128. See, e.g., Kontorovich, supra note 4 (noting the unique position and the broad 
scope the SUA Convention has in relation to customary international law); see also 
SUA Convention, supra note 76, art. 3 (describing various acts as piracy without the 
personal aims limitation). 
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form of international transit. 129 Third, the SUA Convention no 
longer requires the presence of two vessels; if hijackers board the ship 
when it is docked and overwhelm its crew and passengers at a later 
point in time, this act would fall within the SUA Convention 
definitional framework. 130 Moreover, the SUA Convention affords 
states more liberty in their attempts to prosecute aggressors. States 
under the SUA Convention framework may capture aggressors 
anywhere, and capturing states may transfer pirates to a third state for 
• 131prosecut10n purposes. 
While the SUA Convention attempts to eliminate the restrictive 
elements of the Convention on the High Seas/UNCLOS definition of 
piracy, the former has not been as widely ratified and is not generally 
considered a part of customary international law. 132 Regrettably, a 
number of the countries most affected by piracy, such as Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Somalia, have not ratified the SUA Convention. 133 
Thus, the SUA Convention may theoretically represent an attractive 
option for piracy-fighting countries, but its practical reach may prove 
limited because of its lack of universal acceptance and ratification. 134 
After a significant increase in pirate attacks in the early 1990s, 
several organizations developed additional regulations aimed at 
combating piracy. The International Maritime Organization's 
129. SUA Convention, supra note 76, art. 4; see also Peppetti, supra note 107, at 94 
(comparing the SUA Convention's broad territorial reach with the narrower scope of 
UNCLOS). 
130. Under the SUA Convention, any person who "seizes or exercises control over 
a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation" would violate the 
convention. SUA Convention, supra note 76, art. 3. 
131. The SUA Convention authorizes, and under certain circumstances requires, 
member states to establish jurisdiction over the perpetrators, either by extraditing 
them to another member state or prosecuting the perpetrators themselves. The 
following states are required to take measures necessary to establish jurisdiction over 
the perpetrators: the state of which the perpetrator is a national, the state in whose 
territorial waters the act was committed, and the flag state of the victim vessel. The 
following states are permitted to exercise jurisdiction over the offenses: the state of 
which the victim is a national, the state where the perpetrator has a habitual 
residence, or the state where the offense was committed if the motive was to compel 
a state to perform or to abstain from an act. Barrios, supra note 49, at 154-55. 
132. See Azubuike, supra note 93, at 56 (expressing doubts as to the practical 
effectiveness of the SUA Convention, as it only applies to countries that have adopted 
the convention). 
133. Bahar, supra note 8, at 26. 
134. The SUA Convention has not been widely ratified by states for a variety of 
reasons. States may feel that the SUA Convention modifies the approach to piracy 
from the traditional view of piracy as sea-robbery toward piracy as a form ofmaritime 
violence and possibly maritime terrorism. States may feel reluctant to change their 
traditional conception of piracy, especially if they have not been targets of maritime 
terrorism. See Halberstam, supra note 76 (describing the impediments to ratifying the 
broader SUA Convention). 
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(IMO's) Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) developed two circulars 
in 1993, MSC/622 and MSC/623.135 These two circulars make 
detailed recommendations to states for preventing and suppressing 
piracy and provide guidance to the shipping industry. 136 Additionally, 
in 2005, the IMO adopted Resolution 
A. 979 (24), which recommended taking legislative, judicial, and 
law enforcement action to capture and prosecute pirates.137 These 
recommendations encouraged states to extradite pirates and to 
provide vessels that would cooperate in combating piracy. 138 
The SUA Convention was amended in 2005 by adding protocols 
that called for member states to develop the capacity to capture and 
prosecute offenders and required member states to designate which 
government officials were authorized to receive and respond to 
requests for assistance, confirm offenders' nationality, and take other 
appropriate measures to curb pirate activity.139 In Southeast Asia, the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) issued in 2003 its Statement on 
Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to Security, which 
recognized that anti-piracy efforts "require regional maritime security 
strategies and multilateral cooperation 
in their implementation."140 Participating countries agreed to 
exchange information, to discuss shipping lanes for tankers with 
coastguard or naval escorts, and to consider methods to provide 
"technical assistance[] and capacity-building infrastructure" to needy 
countries. 141 ARF countries also agreed to support "efforts to establish 
a legal framework for regional cooperation to combat piracy."142 In 
November 2004, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on 
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia 
(ReCAAP) was finalized with the goal of enhancing cooperation 
135. See Carbin, supra note 19, at 52 (describing the factors that led to the passage 
of IMO Doc. MSC/Circ. 622, which lists recommendations to governments for 
preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships, and IMO Doc. 
MSC/Circ. 623, which gives guidance to shipowners, ship operators, shipmasters, and 
crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships). 
136. Id. 
137. Id.; Int'! Maritime Org. [IMO], Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Water.s 





140. Tenth ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM STATEMENT ON 
COOPERATION AGAINST PIRACY AND OTHER THREATS TO SECURI1Y ~ l(h) (2003), 
available at http://www.aseansec.org/l4837.htm. 
141. Bahar, supra note 8, at 76. 
142. Id. at 76-77. 
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among Asian nations affected by piracy. 143 ReCAAP created the 
Information Sharing Centre, which "facilitates the exchange of 
piracy-related information" among member states. 144 
Finally, in 2008, the U.N. Security Council adopted five resolutions 
that addressed concerns about hijackings in Somali waters. 145 The 
resolutions authorized nations that patrol the Gulf of Aden to enter 
Somali territorial waters to fight or pursue pirates, and called on all 
states to cooperate in efforts to capture and prosecute offenders. 146 
The first resolution adopted, Resolution 1816, authorized nations 
patrolling the Gulf of Aden to enter Somali territorial waters "for the 
purpose of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea," and, 
while in Somali waters, to "[u]se ... in a manner consistent with 
action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under 
relevant international law, all necessary means to repress acts of 
piracy and armed robbery." 147 Resolution 1816 effectively "make[s] 
the rules of international law concerning piracy on the high seas 
applicable also to territorial waters, inter alia permitting pursuit from 
the high seas into these waters."148 Moreover, Resolution 1816 gives 
patrolling nations the authority to use force within Somali territorial 
waters. 149 
Another resolution passed by the U.N. Security Council in 
December 2008, Resolution 1851, gives patrolling nations the 
authority to "undertake all necessary measures that are appropriate in 
Somalia, for the purpose of suppressing acts of piracy and armed 
robbery at sea."150 The Council's use of the expression "in Somalia" 
143. About ReCAAP ISC, http:/ /recap.org/aboutus.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 
2010). 
144. Bahar, supra note 8, at 77. Fifteen countries are currently parties to the 
ReCAAP Agreement: the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, the 
Kingdom of Cambodia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of India, Japan, 
the Republic of Korea, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Union of 
Myanmar, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of 
Singapore, the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, the Kingdom of Thailand, 
and the Socialist Republic ofViet Nam. About ReCAAP ISC, supra note 143. 
145. S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008); S.C. Res. 1846, U.N. 
Doc. (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1844, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1844 (Nov. 20, 2008); S.C. 
Res. 1838, U.N. Doc S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008); S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1816 Qune 2, 2008). 
146. S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 145, 'lrn 2-4, 7(a). 
147. Id. 11 7(a)-(b); see a/,so Carbin, supra note 19, at 52 (noting that international 
law traditionally has permitted any state to capture pirates outside its jurisdiction). 
148. Tullio Treves, Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use ofForce: Developments off the Coast 
ofSomalia, 20 EUR.J. INT'LL. 399, 400, 404 (2009). 
149. See S.C. Res. 1816, supra 145, 11 7(b) (referring to the "all necessary means" 
language). 
150. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 145, 116. 
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apparently authorizes action not only within Somali territorial waters 
but also on mainland Somalia. 151 The expansive language of 
Resolution 1851 arguably expands the scope of hot pursuit of pirates 
by allowing chase to continue from Somali waters to Somali land. 152 
However, this expansion challenges the traditional international 
humanitarian law principle that civilians may not be targeted with 
force on land, except in cases of self-defense.153 Somali pirates are 
also Somali civilians, albeit dangerous ones. 154 It is unclear how or if 
Resolution 1851 's expanded authorization will be employed in 
. 155 
rea1tty. 
Together, the five resolutions are designed to facilitate the task of 
safeguarding the Gulf of Aden by extending patrolling nations' 
jurisdictional and legal enforcement reach into Somalia. The 
resolutions, however, are limited in their scope because: (1) they 
only apply to Somalia; (2) they are not meant to establish any new 
rules of customary piracy law; (3) they require consent of the Somali 
government for any undertaken action; ( 4) they require the 
patrolling nations to respect international humanitarian law; and (5) 
they pertain only to the current patrolling nations in the Gulf of 
Aden. 156 
Maritime powers and other nations willing to engage in the global 
fight against piracy have jurisdiction to capture, detain, and 
prosecute pirates based on domestic and international laws and 
regulations. 157 Some of these regulations, however, are limited in 
scope, and piracy-fighting countries may need to rely on creative legal 
arguments in order to support their antipiracy operations. The 
151. Treves, supra note 148, at 404. 
152. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 145, 'll'll 2, 6; see also Kontorovich, supra note 4 
(arguing that the language in Resolution 1851 broadens the use of force against 
pirates because a state can pursue the pirate once on dry land). 
153. See Kontorovich, supra note 4 (emphasizing that the Security Council 
resolutions require that anti-pirate actions taken in Somali territory be approved by 
the Somali provisional government and be consistent with international 
humanitarian law). 
154. Id. 
155. Id. (explaining that the powers granted by the anti-pirate resolutions have 
gone "largely if not entirely unutilized, with military action against pirates taking 
place in international waters and confined to small, reportedly defensive incidents"). 
156. See Treves, supra note 148, at 404-08; see also Milena Sterio, Fighting Piracy in 
Somalia (and Elsewhere): Why More Is Needed, 33 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. (forthcoming 
2010). 
157. See John Bradford, Shifting the Tides Against Piracy in Southeast Asian Water.s, 48 
As!AN SURV. 473, 485 (2008) (noting that the Southeast Asian Cooperation Against 
Terrorism (SEACAT), which includes nations such as the United States, Thailand, 
and Malaysia, enables countries to share resources in the pursuit of capturing and 
deterring pirates). 
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involvement of the U.N. Security Council will hopefully both provide 
piracy-fighting countries with more direct legal support for their 
actions and continue until this problem is solved. 
III. PRACTICAL RESPONSES TO ELIMINATE PIRACY 
The most significant practical solutions to eradicate piracy, in 
Somalia or elsewhere, include (1) a serious commitment by the 
affected state to fight pirates; (2) regional cooperation between the 
affected state and its neighbors; (3) law enforcement and diplomatic 
efforts to combat piracy; and ( 4) building the capacity of the affected 
state by the most powerful maritime nations. These solutions have 
already been employed in Southeast Asia, where piracy surged in the 
late 1990s and the early 2000s but has been curbed and almost 
eradicated in recent years. The Southeast Asian model will therefore 
be examined below, and its application suggested for the Somali 
piracy problem. 
A. State Commitment 
The best results in the fight against piracy can be achieved if the 
territorial state-the place where pirates base their operations, dock 
their ships, and keep their prey-makes a significant commitment 
toward eliminating piracy. 158 First, territorial states can combat piracy 
by enacting harsh domestic criminal statutes that routinely hand 
down stiff jail sentences to pirates. 159 Moreover, territorial states can 
take an active role in antipiracy efforts by increasing law enforcement 
efforts to patrol their coastlines and regional waters, ensuring that 
pirates do not thrive undetected in areas beyond the reach of the 
law.16° Finally, territorial states can crack down on the pirates' 
communication with their supplier networks, which cuts off the 
logistical support upon which pirate operations heavily rely. 161 
States are most successful at fighting piracy when they are able to 
invest substantial resources in combating pirates. 162 States that have 
seen some success include Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, all of 
158. Id. at 478. 
159. Id. at 479-81. 
160. See id. at 481 (explaining that after establishing the Malaysian Maritime 
Enforcement Agency, the Malaysian government increased enforcement efforts to 
control wateiways and deter pirates). 
161. See id. at 480 (discussing the situation in Malaysia, where the government is 
targeting corrupt officials and military officers who are essential to the pirates' 
operations). 
162. Id. at 479. 
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whom have battled pirates in the Malacca Strait and will be discussed 
below. 
Indonesia has strengthened its maritime security programs in 
recent years by demonstrating that it is willing to crack down on 
piracy on all levels. 163 The Indonesian government has acted against 
pirates' shore contacts by attempting to rein in corrupt officials and 
military officers whose support is necessary for successful piracy 
operations. 164 Indonesia has also focused increasingly on maritime 
security operations by sending over twenty navy ships and several 
aircraft into pirate-infested waters. 165 The Indonesian efforts seem to 
be working; for example, in March 2006, Indonesian marines and 
special forces successfully liberated a 1,400-passenger ferry that had 
been hijacked by fifteen pirates.166 
Malaysia has also been determined in its efforts to reduce piracy on 
its side of the Malacca Strait. 167 The Malaysian government devoted 
specific resources to areas where government control was the 
weakest. 168 In those areas, the Malaysian government launched 
programs to establish greater awareness and control over waterways 
and to deter pirates from attacking in such waters. 169 Malaysia also 
established the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency, which 
began patrols at the end of 2005. 110 According to Malaysian officials, 
the increased patrols have resulted in several pirate arrests, and IMB 
numbers show that the number of pirate attacks in the Strait of 
Malacca has significantly decreased in the last few years. 171 
Singapore, like Indonesia and Malaysia, has contributed to joint 
patrols in the Strait of Malacca "using commandos, frigates, and swift 
patrol boats."172 Singapore has also ratified ReCAAP, whereby it will 
participate in the agreement's regional piracy-fighting scheme. 173 As 
in the example of Malacca Strait countries, significant territorial state 
163. But see id. at 479-80 (noting that Indonesia "remains a country with one of 
the world's highest piracy rates and the state remains distracted by other higher 
priority concerns" such as "suppressing terrorism ... and alleviating poverty"). 




168. See id. at 480-81 (noting that the Malaysian government shifted its antipiracy 
efforts to the waters around Sabah in East Malaysia where the lack of enforcement 
was greatest). 
169. Id. at 481. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 480-81. 
172. Bahar, supra note 8, at 81. 
173. Id. at 77. 
2010] THE SOMALI PIRACY PROBLEM 1477 
commitments to tackle piracy can contribute toward the decrease of 
piracy attacks and even toward a complete eradication of pirate 
activity. 
While the above approach could work well in some regions, it may 
pose significant challenges in chaotic and lawless countries like 
Somalia, where piracy often thrives. 174 "Piracy typically occurs where 
gaps exist in political control because it is in such areas that the 
capacity of states to deal with the problem is weakest."175 While 
increased commitment on behalf of the territorial state to deal with 
pirates helps tremendously, such commitment simply may not be 
possible because of Somalia's lack of political, law enforcement, and 
military capacity to confront the problem. To eradicate Somali 
piracy, regional cooperation and capacity building may prove more 
successful. 
B. Regi,onal Cooperation 
When pirate attacks first surged in the Malacca Strait, the 
Southeast Asian states that were most affected seemed hesitant to 
work together and uninterested in establishing any form of active 
cooperation against piracy. 176 That attitude has changed in the past 
few years, as Southeast Asian states realized that regional cooperation 
may be the best approach in the fight against piracy. 177 During the 
late 1990s, Southeast Asian states actively participated in regional 
meetings and discussed possible "confidence-building" activities. 178 
These types of arrangements proved to be insufficient against 
Malacca Strait pirates. 179 Since 2003, regional governments have 
undertaken more significant cooperative efforts. 180 In a series of 
statements, Southeast Asian states demonstrated their increased 
174. Sterio, supra note 156. 
175. Bradford, supra note 157, at 478. 
176. Id. at 481. 
177. See id. at 482; Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 44 (noting that in response to 
the piracy threat in the Strait of Malacca, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia 
"embarked on a program of coordinated air and sea patrols that dramatically 
reduced marine piracy throughout the straits"); see also id. (describing the U.S. 
response to piracy in 2007 which emphasized collaborative action between maritime 
countries). 
178. Stanley Weeks, New Initiatives in Maritime Cooperation, in THE BEST OF TIMES, 
THE WORST OF TIMES: MARITIME SECURHY IN THE As!A-PACIFIC 251, 253 (Joshua Ho & 
Catherine Zara Raymond eds., 2005). 
179. Mal'k Valencia, Piracy and Politics in Southeast Asia, in PIRACY IN SOUTHEAST 
AsIA: STATUS, ISSUES, AND RESPONSES 103, 105 (Derek Johnson & Mark Valencia eds., 
2005). 
180. Bradford, supra note 157, at 482. 
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resolve to seriously tackle piracy problems. 181 As a result, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, and Singapore committed to cooperate with each other. 182 
In July 2004, these three governments improved information sharing 
and began a program of "trilateral coordinated maritime surface 
patrols called the Malacca Strait Sea Patrols."183 In the years following 
the initial program, the agreement was expanded to link surface and 
air patrols with intelligence exchange in order to coordinate efforts 
of surface and air units. 184 Moreover, the three governments 
coordinated airborne surveillance under the so-called "Eyes in the 
Sky" agreement. 185 "In the past few years, Southeast Asian littoral 
states that had previously sought to downplay piracy have openly 
acknowledged the problem, cooperation has risen to new levels, and 
the three states bordering the Strait of Malacca have expanded the 
forces deployed to deter attacks and catch pirates."186 The decrease in 
the number of pirate attacks in the Malacca Strait confirms that 
regional cooperation between the Malaysian, Indonesian, and 
Singaporean governments has been effective and successful in piracy­
figh ting efforts. 18; 
A similar type of regional cooperation has been established in West 
and Central Africa. In July 2008, member states of the Maritime 
Organization of West and Central Africa adopted a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) to create a joint coast guard and to authorize 
hot pursuit of pirates off the coast of Nigeria.188 It will be interesting 
to follow developments off the Nigerian coast to determine whether 
regional cooperation in West and Central Africa will lead to a 
decrease in piracy. Considering the success of the Southeast Asia 
program, this likely will be the case. 
A similar type of regional cooperation could certainly be discussed 
for Somalia. While Somalia does not have a government capable of 
181. See id. (discussing statements issued by organizations such as the Tenth 
ASEAN Regional Forum that met in Phnom Penh in June 2003, the June 2005 
Shangri-Ia Dialogue in Singapore, the Batam Joint Statement of the fourth Tripartite 
Ministerial Meeting of the Littoral States on the Strait of Malacca of August 2005, 
and the Jakarta Statement on Enhancement of Safety, Security, and Environmental 






187. See Kraska & Wilson, supra note 22, at 54 (noting that "[a] regional approach 
to piracy in the Strait of Malacca and Singapore has led to significant reduction in 
the incident of maritime piracy"). 
188. Carbin, supra note 19, at 55. 
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significantly contributing to joint regional efforts to combat piracy, 
other littoral states may be able to work together on this significant 
problem. Kenya has already expressed its willingness to act as a 
strong regional partner to the world maritime powers by agreeing to 
prosecute 
captured pirates in its domestic courts. 189 Arabian Peninsula 
countries could similarly deploy more resources toward combating 
piracy, especially in light of the challenge that piracy poses for oil 
tankers that routinely pass through the Gulf ofAden. 190 
Moreover, strong maritime countries could work closely with 
regional partners on anti-piracy efforts. For example, in November 
2008, the European Union established Operation Atlanta against 
Somali pirates, and in January 2009, a multinational task force, which 
included representatives from major maritime powers, created a 
coalition of patrolling nations to protect the Gulf of Aden.191 Such 
maritime patrols led by maritime powers have successfully deterred 
pirates and, in some cases, detained them. 192 In addition, these 
maritime patrols could partner with regional countries, such as Kenya 
and the Arabian Peninsula states, to improve the scope and breadth 
of law enforcement operations. Even in the absence of Somalia, 
increased regional cooperation between Kenya, the Arabian 
Peninsula countries, and some of the largest maritime powers already 
present in the Gulf ofAden, could contribute significantly toward the 
189. See Kraska & Wilson, supra note 22, at 51 (describing the attempt by Somali 
pirates to hijack the Safina al Bisarat in 2006). A U.S. battleship that was in the 
vicinity managed to seize control of the pirate vessel and detain ten pirates. Id. The 
pirates were transferred to Mombasa, Kenya, convicted, and sentenced to seven-year 
prison sentences. Id. 
190. Id. It is worth noting that the IMO hosted a regional meeting in the Arabian 
Peninsula twice: in Yemen in 2005 and in Oman in 2006. These meetings were 
focused on the possibility of establishing regional agreements to implement 
antipiracy measures. 
Id. at 54. 
191. Carbin, supra note 19, at 52. 
192. See, e.g., Daniel Wallis, NATO Frees 20 Hostages; Pirates Seize Belgian Ship, 
REUTERS, Apr. 18, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLil 1637320090418 
(last visited on Mar. 20, 2010) (noting that France has brought captured pirates to 
Paris for prosecution); see also Al Goodman, Somali Pirate Suspects Indicted in Spain, 
CNN.COM, (Nov. 16, 2009) 
http:/ /edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/l l/16/spain.pirates/index.html 
(discussing that Spain indicted two Somali pirates in a Spanish court); Suspect in Ship 
Hijacking Charged with Piracy, CNN.COM, (Apr. 21, 2009) 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/05/20/ny.pirate.indictment/index.html 
(noting that the United States has indicted a detained Somali pirate in a U.S. court). 
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eradication of Somali piracy. 193 The Strait of Malacca regional 
cooperation model should be examined carefully as a viable solution 
to the Somali piracy problem. 
C. Capacity Building 
The world's biggest maritime powers should be willing and able to 
help fight Somali piracy. In the context of Southeast Asian piracy, 
countries like Australia, China, India, Japan, and the United States all 
offered different forms of assistance. 194 As mentioned above, NATO 
countries have also assisted in the Gulf of Aden by forming regular 
patrols that often chase and apprehend pirates. 195 Capacity building 
through continuous assistance by the world's maritime powers is a 
key element to a successful long-term solution against piracy. 196 In 
the case of Somalia, capacity building and assistance by maritime 
powers is even more essential than it was in Southeast Asia. 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, the three Southeast Asian nations 
most affected by piracy in the Malacca Straits, are relatively stable 
nations that were able to fight piracy on their own to a certain 
degree. Somalia, to the contrary, is a failed state and can do very 
little to curb piracy off its coast. 197 Because of their stability, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore were able to collaborate 
successfully on anti-piracy operations; Somalia, however, is unlikely to 
be capable of cooperating successfully and contributing to any 
regional antipiracy efforts. Thus, the case for capacity building in 
Somalia seems even stronger than that of its counterpart in Southeast 
Asia. 
Japan, a powerful maritime nation, is an excellent model for the 
types of capacity-building and assistance that countries like Somalia 
may need. Over the last decade, the Japanese Coast Guard has been 
conducting anti-piracy exercises throughout the Southeast Asian 
region. 198 Japan also provides direct assistance to littoral states; for 
example, it has provided Malaysian forces with "satellite tracking 
193. See Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 41 ("While it is impossible to eradicate 
maritime piracy completely, the threat can be greatly reduced if we broaden efforts 
to work with international partners."). 
194. Bradford, supra note 157, at 483. 
195. See, e.g., Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 42 (recognizing the combined 
patrol efforts of NATO and the European Union). 
196. Bradford, supra note 157, at 483. 
197. Treves, supra note 148, at 400. 
198. See Bradford, supra note 157, at 483-84 (discussing the material and training 
thatJapan has offered to neighboring countries because of the threat pirates pose to 
its national security and economic stability). 
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systems, satellite telephones, high-capacity computers, and radio 
communications systems."199 Japan has also pledged over $15 million 
to Indonesia to construct patrol ships and vessels.200 On a 
multinational level, Japan's prime mm1ster initially proposed 
ReCAAP, the world's first inter-governmental body focused on piracy, 
and thirteen other regional states joined the agreement.201 
The United States has also contributed to the fight against piracy.202 
United States maritime forces have conducted a series of exercises 
with their Southeast Asian regional partners.203 Moreover, the United 
States has been promoting the systemic sharing of information and 
the use of information technologies that enable regional states to 
better identify, capture, and deter pirates.204 Although some 
Southeast Asian states were initially skeptical about American 
intrusion into their sovereign waters, officials from Malaysia and 
Singapore have recently expressed enthusiasm about increased 
American efforts to help curb Malacca Strait piracy.205 IfAmerican or 
other foreign nations' involvement in Somalia is carefully planned so 
that any military operations within the Somali territory retain their 
antipiracy scope and do not appear to threaten Somali sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, then such foreign powers' involvement likely 
will be appreciated and welcomed in East Africa.206 
Similar but more comprehensive capacity building efforts need to 
occur in Somalia. Maritime powers such as the United States need to 
realize that their own interests may be indirectly threatened by the 
increased incidence of pirate attacks in the Indian Ocean.207 Somali 
199. Id. at 484. 
200. Id. 
201. Id.; see also supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text (describing the ASEAN 
Regional Forum and the efforts of its member countries). 
202. Bradford, supra note 157, at 484. 
203. Id. at 485. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. See, e.g., Peter O'Neil, Aid Agencies Release Scathing Critique of Afghan Counter­
insurgency Efforts, CANADA.COM, Apr. 3, 2009, 
http:/ /www.canada.com/news/agencies+release+scathing+critique+Afghan+counter 
+insurgency+efforts/1460393/story.html (suggesting that interference by other 
nations is not easily accepted and noting that a group of international aid agencies 
issued a scathing report regarding counter-insurgency efforts by countries such as 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada). Great powers such as the 
United States have been criticized for their over involvement in other nations' 
internal affairs. Id. Thus, a power such as the United States must be careful in its 
approach to Somalia in order to ensure that any military involvement corresponds to 
pure antipiracy operations and does not resemble intervention or invasion. 
207. Bradford, supra note 157, at 484 (noting that the United States assisted in the 
eradication of Southeast Asian piracy because of "non-traditional security concerns" 
such as terrorism and seaborne proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction). 
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pirates may develop ties to terrorist groups that operate directly 
against American interests such as al-Qaida.208 Moreover, Somali 
pirates could fund or partner with other terrorist organizations and 
thus contribute to an overall rise in global violence. 209 Somali piracy 
could also threaten the regional stability of East Africa, and has the 
potential to undermine the national security of neighboring states 
like Ethiopia and Kenya, which, although more stable than Somalia, 
already have their share of domestic problems.210 Accordingly, 
maritime powers like the United States need to begin investing in 
Somalia, and should undertake significant capacity building projects, 
as Japan did in Southeast Asia, to help stabilize the region. 
IV. SOLUTIONS FOR SOMALIA 
Many legal and practical tools, some theoretical and some already 
utilized in Southeast Asia, are available to fight Somali piracy. But 
the question remains: once Somali pirates are captured by piracy­
fighting nations, where should they be brought to justice? The 
sections below explore this question and seek to provide insightful 
answers. 
A. Legal 
As stated above, fighting piracy in Somalia should be grounded in 
law: countries involved in patrolling the coast of Somalia need to 
both have a sound basis available to justify their seizure of pirates and 
find appropriate tribunals willing to prosecute detained individuals. 211 
1. jurisdiction 
Piracy-fighting countries can rely on a variety of international 
treaties, customary law, and U.N. Security Council resolutions in 
order to justify their capture and prosecution of apprehended 
pirates. UNCLOS, the most widely accepted international maritime 
treaty,212 already provides that any nation may capture pirates on the 
high seas. The capturing nation may then prosecute pirates in its 
208. See supra Part LC (discussing the link between piracy and terrorism). 
209. Id. 
210. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 43 (noting that the issues in this region 
range from disrupting maritime communication to hindering the delivery of oil 
throughout the world). 
211. See supra Parts II.A, II.B (discussing both domestic and international piracy 
laws). 
212. See supra Part H.B. (discussing UNCLOS in relation to other maritime 
treaties). 
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domestic courts.213 The SUA Convention extends the jurisdictional 
basis for the capture and prosecution of pirates by allowing any 
nation to capture pirates if the victim vessel was in some form of 
international transit, and by authorizing both the capturing nation 
and other willing nations to prosecute the captured pirates.214 A 
combination of these two treaties would arguably fill the 
jurisdictional gaps and would prevent pirates from escaping capture 
and prosecution through legal jurisdictional maneuvers. 215 
The problem with this hypothesis is two-fold. First, the SUA 
Convention is not as widely accepted as UNCLOS and does not 
represent customary mternatJona· . aw. 216 Thus, countnes that are not11 . 
signatories to the SUA Convention, such as Somalia, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia, may escape its reach by pointing out that they never agreed 
to the convention's extended jurisdictional reach.217 Second, even 
countries bound by the SUA Convention have other legal obligations 
that may impede the functioning of this maritime treaty. For 
example, many western democracies are party to major human rights 
treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights or the Convention Against Torture.218 All such human rights 
treaties prohibit the transfer of any individual to a country where the 
individual is likely to be tortured (the non-refoulement obligation).219 
Consequently, a capturing nation that is bound by these human 
rights treaties may not be able to transfer captured pirates to a third 
state willing to prosecute them if there is a strong likelihood that the 
third state would torture pirates.220 In this regard, human rights 
obligations may have the effect of limiting broad prosecution regimes 
such as SUA, thereby reducing their practical value. 
Piracy-fighting countries may be able to circumvent the above 
issues by relying on international custom. In fact, some scholars 
argue that UNCLOS did not simply codify existing international 
213. UNCLOS, supra note 70, art. 105. 
214. See SUA Convention, supra note 76, art. 7. 
215. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 52 ("Piracy thus flourishes at the seams of 
globalization because jurisdiction is unclear and pirates exploit the inherent 
isolation of individual vessels and nations."). 
216. Alfred P. Rubin, The Fletcher Sch., Tufts Univ., Comments at ASIL Meeting 
(Mar. 26, 2009). 
217. Azubuike, supra note 93, at 56 (concluding that the SUA Convention is not 
reflective of customary law and only binds its signatory parties). 
218. Kontorovich, supra note 4, at n.9 (noting that such treaties include the 
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customary law in the area of piracy, but rather restricted existing 
customary norms. 221 Thus, customary law goes farther than UNCLOS 
in providing jurisdiction to both capture and prosecute pirates.222 If 
piracy-fighting countries can establish that international custom in 
the area of piracy law allows nations to pursue and apprehend pirates 
anywhere, not simply on the high seas, then nations potentially could 
target Somali pirates without worrying about territorial sea 
restrictions. 
Moreover, while it is trUe that hot pursuit of pirates into the Somali 
territorial waters would violate state sovereignty under article 2(4) of 
the U.N. Charter,223 one can advance the argument that 
apprehending pirates does not undermine Somali territorial 
integrity. In fact, capturing pirates could work to strengthen 
Somalia's territorial integrity by ensuring that rogue pirate operators 
do not threaten its future stability. Piracy-fighting nations would 
simply be doing something that Somalia could and should do for 
itself-capturing dangerous pirates.224 No evidence suggests that such 
actions threaten Somalia as a country or its sovereign national 
interests. 
Furthermore, if piracy-fighting countries can establish that 
international custom in the area of piracy law allows any state, not 
simply the capturing state, to prosecute pirates under the principle of 
universal jurisdiction, then the legal hurdle of finding an adequate 
forum to try Somali pirates could be surmounted. "Piracy is the 
original universal jurisdiction crime,"225 and it can be argued under 
customary law that the principle of universal jurisdiction itself would 
be contradicted by the limitation of allowing only the capturing 
221. See Barrios, supra note 49, at 162 (asserting that UNCLOS represents a 
"significant departure from what the international community accepted as piracy"). 
222. Bahar, supra note 8, at 27-38 (exploring the customary law definition of 
piracy, arguing that it embraces acts of maritime terrorism committed for political 
aims, and then alleging that UNCLOS simply codifies this broader definition of 
piracy under customary law). 
223. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, (prohibiting member states from using force 
against any other member state in violation of that state's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity). 
224. In fact, scholars have already argued that the UNCLOS system of requiring 
that the act of piracy happen on the high seas in order for the convention's universal 
jurisdiction provisions to be triggered works only if the coastal state has a municipal 
law proscribing pirate attacks, is willing to enforce it, and is physically able to do so. 
See Bahar, supra note 8, at 19 (concluding that in Somalia, the UNCLOS system does 
not work because Somalia is unable to do anything about the pirate attacks due to 
the absence of a functional government). 
225. Kontorovich, supra note 4; see also Azubuike, supra note 93, at 44 (noting that 
under customary international law, pirates were subject to universal jurisdiction by 
any state). 
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nation to bring pirates to justice. Pirates, after all, are hostis humani 
generi, and as such, they should face justice in any willing state's 
courts, regardless of whether that state captured them or not.226 
Thus, customary law may help piracy-fighting countries by filling the 
UNCLOS-inflicted gaps and by extending the treaty's reach. 
Piracy-fighting countries in the Somali context can also rely on 
U.N. Security Council Resolutions, which expand the geographical 
area in which pirates can be effectively apprehended.227 The five 
different resolutions, passed in 2008, allow nations that routinely 
patrol the Gulf ofAden to enter Somali territorial waters if seeking to 
capture pirates.228 The resolutions allow patrolling nations to 
penetrate the Somali mainland in their piracy-fighting operations, as 
well as to engage in the hot pursuit of pirates on Somali territory.229 
The resolutions are thus an important legal tool for piracy-fighting 
countries because they extend jurisdiction to capture pirates into an 
otherwise prohibited zone: the Somali territorial waters and 
mainland. While it is true that the resolutions also contain 
limitations,230 they nonetheless represent an important vehicle 
allowing patrolling nations' navy ships to combat pirates. Moreover, 
to the extent that the above customary international law arguments 
are accepted, they would supplement the Security Council 
resolutions and would apply to the Somali context even if the 
resolutions themselves were no longer temporally applicable. 
2. Piracy trials 
Piracy fighting countries currently face a tremendous problem: 
what to do with captured pirates? Determining which state could and 
should prosecute pirates captured at sea is difficult, and "it takes 
226. Azubuike, supra note 93, at 44 (commenting that under customary 
international law, pirates were treated as "enemies of human kind"). 
227. See supra Part Il.B (discussing the various international treaties regulating 
piracy). 
228. See supra notes 146--156 and accompanying text (discussing the passage and 
substance of the five U.N. Security Council resolutions relating to piracy passed in 
2008). 
229. Kontorovich, supra note 4. 
230. Treves, supra note 148, at 404-08 (discussing the resolutions' limitations, 
which include: temporal jurisdiction; the fact that each resolution is only valid for a 
six-month period and needs to be renewed thereafter by the U.N. Security Council; 
the need to obtain consent from the Somali government for each transgression into 
Somali territory by the patrolling nations; the fact that authority to enter Somali 
territory is only given to countries presently patrolling the Gulf of Aden; the fact that 
each resolution specifies that it only pertains to Somalia and does not purport to 
modify customary law; and the necessity for the patrolling nations in each instance to 
respect international humanitarian law). 
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awhile to sort out the logistical and legal issues."231 This Article argues 
that maritime powers interested in combating Somali pirates should 
ensure that pirates are tried in criminal forums. 232 Various 
prosecution options exist, ranging from domestic trials in the courts 
of the capturing or transferee nations, to international trials in 
specialized piracy tribunals. 
First, pirates could always be prosecuted in the domestic courts of 
the capturing nation.233 While piracy trials may be logistically 
difficult, costly, and politically challenging, piracy is a serious crime 
and should never go unpunished and undeterred. 234 Piracy-fighting 
countries should overcome their own political unwillingness to 
prosecute individual pirates, and routinely bring captured pirates to 
trial in their own courts. Major maritime powers, like the United 
States, France, and Spain, have already begun criminal proceedings 
against captured pirates; more nations should follow suit in this 
direction.235 
Second, pirates could also be prosecuted in the domestic courts of 
a regional partner-a nation willing to take all captured pirates and 
to subject them to its own criminal process. The United Kingdom, a 
maritime power uninterested in prosecuting pirates domestically,236 
has experimented with this option. The country has entered into an 
MOU with Kenya, a regional partner, whereby Kenya has agreed to 
prosecute any pirates the United Kingdom transfers to it.237 This 
agreement, although of dubious legality under UNCLOS, may work 
231. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 45. 
232. Unfortunately, some pirates have already been released from custody by the 
capturing nation because of a lack of an available legal forum in which to prosecute 
them. For example, in September 2008, the Danish navy released several captured 
pirates on a Somali beach because of unclear jurisdictional rules. Id. at 46. This 
approach, dubbed "catch and release," has been criticized. Id. 
233. Prosecuting Somali pirates in Somalia is not currently an option because 
Somalia is a failed state and does not have any responsible legal authorities capable 
of conducting a piracy trial. Id. 
234. See supra Part I.C. l. (discussing the importance of deterring Somali pirates). 
235. France successfully captured pirates twice in 2008 and brought the pirates to 
trial in Paris. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 46. Spain has recently brought two 
pirates to Spain to stand trial there. Goodman, supra note 192. In April 2009, after a 
group of pirates attempted to seize the Maersk Alabama in the Indian Ocean, the 
United States captured a pirate and brought the detained pirate to New York to 
stand trial. Suspect in Ship Hijacking Charged with Piracy, supra note 192. 
236. See Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 46 (noting that the British Foreign 
Ministry has indicated that P,irates brought into the country to be prosecuted "could 
be granted political asylum'). 
237. Id.; see also Azubuike, supra note 94, at 55 (discussing the agreement between 
the United States, the United Kingdom and Kenya governing the transfer of 
captured pirates to Kenya for trial). 
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well.238 For example, a group of pirates captured in 2006 were 
prosecuted in Kenya and given seven-year prison sentences.239 
Additional trials of this sort may help strengthen the transfer 
mechanism and send a strong deterrent message to Somali pirates, 
who can expect to face trial in Kenya instead of anticipating release if 
captured by the United Kingdom. 240 Other maritime powers should 
reach out to regional partners willing to prosecute Somali pirates, in 
the way the United Kingdom reached out to Kenya.241 
Regional partnerships are an attractive option for a variety of 
reasons. First, these partnerships end the cycle of impunity by 
ensuring that pirates do not avoid prosecution simply because the 
capturing nation does not want to try them in its domestic courts. 
Under this model, captured pirates would always be transferred to a 
partner state for prosecution. Moreover, regional partnerships allow 
for a regional solution to piracy. 242 Instead of transferring captured 
pirates to a geographically distant country, like the United States or 
the United Kingdom, this model allows pirates to be prosecuted in 
the courts of a regional partner, such as Kenya, a country bordering 
Somalia. 
Second, regional trials espouse a number of benefits. Regional 
trials may send a stronger deterrent message to existing pirates, who 
may hear and know more about a Kenyan trial than an American or 
British proceeding. Regional trials may also illustrate that African 
countries are capable of dealing with problems on their own and that 
the developed world need not impose its own justice by handing 
238. The majority of scholars interpret UNCLOS as authorizing only the 
capturing nation to prosecute pirates, and as prohibiting pirate transfers to third 
countries for prosecution. See Kontorovich, supra note 4 (stating that UNCLOS 
drafting history makes clear that it was "intended to preclude transfers to third-party 
states"). 
239. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 47. 
240. In another piracy incident-the hijacking of the Japanese tanker Alondra 
Rainbow-the Indian Navy captured the pirates and their ship and transported the 
ship to India, where the pirates were prosecuted and convicted. India, therefore, has 
also conducted a domestic piracy trial. Azubuike, supra note 93, at 55; see also 
Peppetti, supra note 107, at 108-09 (discussing the Alondra Rainbow incident in more 
depth and noting that India tried the pirates under universal jurisdiction, as there is 
no piracyjurisdiction in the Indian penal code). 
241. The United States also signed an MOU with Kenya on Jan. 16, 2009. See 
James Thuo Gathii, Jurisdiction to Prosecute Non-national Pirates Captured by Third States 
Under Kenyan and International Law, 32 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. (forthcoming 
2010), available at http://works.bepress.com/james_gathii/16/. Kenya also signed a 
similar MOU with the European Union on March 6, 2009, and another MOU has 
been discussed between Kenya and China. Id. 
242. Bahar, supra note 8, at 83 (arguing that regional pirate prosecution 
reinforces the view that Africans are capable of establishing and maintaining a good 
system of governance). 
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down western criminal sentences to captured pirates.24~ Finally, 
regional trials make sense logistically: evidence and witnesses are 
located much closer to Kenya than to the United States or Britain 
and therefore, Kenyan courts may face significantly fewer hurdles in 
the prosecution of Somali pirates than their American or British 
counterparts. 244 Therefore, maritime nations combating Somali 
pirates should explore regional partnerships more substantially. 
Third, pirates could be prosecuted in an ad hoc piracy tribunal. 
Scholars have considered the idea of a new ad hoc tribunal dedicated 
to the issue of piracy that would be located in the region and 
routinely prosecute captured Somali pirates.245 This idea is appealing 
from a theoretical standpoint, but it may have significant drawbacks 
from a practical standpoint. Establishing a new tribunal would be 
difficult to say the least: the tribunal must be located in a country 
willing and capable of accommodating an international body; include 
highly-trained judges who are experts in maritime law; and provide 
fine-tuned laws to ensure all captured pirates receive a fair and just 
trial.246 From a cost perspective, the establishment of a new ad hoc 
piracy tribunal may simply outweigh the resources available to fight 
piracy. An ad hoc piracy tribunal, for all the above reasons, will likely 
never be established. 
Fourth, pirates could be prosecuted in the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), provided that the court's jurisdiction is amended to 
allow prosecutions of piracy-related crimes. 247 Some scholars have 
already expressed regret that the ICC statute as originally drafted did 
not contemplate the crime of piracy.248 Because piracy is a universal 
jurisdiction crime, it is logical that pirates would be prosecuted in the 
only universal criminal court. When the ICC statute was negotiated, 
piracy seemed to have vanished and certainly did not represent the 
issue of global magnitude that it does today. Thus, the ICC drafters 
243. Id. 
244. Id. at 82. 
245. Id. at 81-84 (advocating for the creation of a regional piracy court in Kenya). 
246. See Peppetti, supra note 107, at 142 (noting that creating an ad hoc tribunal 
"would require significant effort and depend upon a strong desire for individual 
accountability coupled with a willingness to delegate sovereignty over certain 
criminal justice matters"). 
247. See Douglas R. Burgess, Jr., Hostis Humani Generi: Piracy, Terrorism and a New 
International Law, 13 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 293, 328-30, 335 (2006) 
(arguing that ICC jurisdiction should be expanded to include a crime of terrorism 
and that piracy should fall within the definition of terrorism and thus be covered by 
the newly expanded ICC statute). 
248. Azubuike, supra note 93, at 55 ("It is a gaping omission that the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court did not deal with piracy."). 
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may not have had enough of an interest or incentive to include the 
crime of piracy in the court's statute. Today, in light of the changed 
climate in Somalia and the dangers posed by piracy, major super 
powers may have sufficient political incentive to come together and 
to redraft the ICC statute to include the crime of piracy. At the least, 
the ICC statute could adopt the UNCLOS restricted definition of 
piracy, as most countries already accept this definition as customary 
law and would likely not object to its formulation in the ICC. If 
pirates were prosecuted in the ICC, however, the court's judges 
would need to develop expertise in maritime law, and the court's 
caseload and dockets would increase significantly. This increase 
could cause problems for the ICC, as the court was established with 
limited resources and with the notion that it would only prosecute 
those responsible for the gravest violations of international law.249 
While Somali pirates may be dangerous, they probably do not 
amount to the type of heinous defendant contemplated by the ICC 
drafters. The ICC model, although attractive, may contain significant 
limitations and may ultimately prove of little value. 
Finally, pirates could be prosecuted in the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). 250 This tribunal, established in 1996, 
is a specialized court equipped to deal with maritime disputes251 and is 
composed of highly trained judges who are experts on the law of the 
sea. 
252 ITLOS would represent the ideal venue for the prosecution of 
captured pirates.253 Because it is already a functioning tribunal, no 
additional costs would be incurred if pirates were prosecuted here, 
unlike in the ad hoc tribunal model, where significant monetary 
contributions would be needed by major maritime powers in order to 
249. About the International Criminal Court, http:/ /www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2010). 
250. ITLOS Website, General Information, http:/ /www.itlos.org/start2_en.html 
(follow "ITLOS Website" hyperlink; then follow "General Information - Overview" 
hyperlink; then follow "Introduction" hyperlink) (last visited May 15, 2010). 
251. ITLOS Website, International Tribunal Law for the Sea, 
http:/ /www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (follow "General Information - Overview" 
hyperlink; then follow "International Tribunal Law for the Law of the Sea" 
hyperlink) (last visited May 15, 2010). 
252. Id. 
253. But see Press Release, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea [ITLOS], 
No. 135 (Apr. 24, 2009), availabl,e at http:/ /www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (follow 
"News - Press Releases" hyperlink; then follow "2009" hyperlink) ("Recently certain 
news organizations have been circulating erroneous information stating that the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is prepared to try pirates. This 
information is inaccurate, since, in accordance with the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, the Tribunal deals mainly with disputes between States Parties 
to the Convention; it is not a criminal court and has no competence to try Pirates."). 
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start the process. ITLOS judges are highly trained; thus, no training 
would be needed and no additional personnel costs incurred by any 
nation. While it is true that the ITLOS statute would need to be 
amended to provide for jurisdiction over the crime of piracy, this 
process could be less difficult than that needed to amend the ICC 
statute. ITLOS already includes a variety of maritime issues and 
offenses.254 The crime of piracy fits into the statutory scheme, and it 
does not represent a significant departure from the types of issues 
that this tribunal already handles.255 Finally, because ITLOS was 
designed to deal with all maritime issues between its member states, 
not simply the most heinous disputes and offenders, it could arguably 
accommodate a higher number of trials without losing any of its 
original establishing characteristics. Accordingly, ITLOS may be an 
appropriate choice of venue for the prosecution of Somali pirates. 
All of the above types of tribunals are possible venues for the 
prosecution of Somali pirates. Piracy-fighting countries must ensure 
that for each detained pirate, one of the available tribunals is used for 
a piracy prosecution. Detained pirates should never be released or 
benefit from any de facto form of impunity, and pirate prosecution 
should fit within a structure of regional and global antipiracy efforts. 
In the same manner that countries have cooperated to form law 
enforcement and military antipiracy operations, such countries 
should collaborate to ensure that every pirate is brought before a 
jurisdiction that is prepared to mete out legal punishment. 
B. Practical 
For a true solution to the Somali piracy problem, greater 
cooperation between Somalia and its neighboring states and an 
improved commitment by major maritime states to increase their 
patrolling and law enforcement presence in the Gulf of Aden and 
farther out in the Indian Ocean is needed. "What is needed now is a 
network of shipping states, regional partners, and major maritime 
powers that can collaborate on how to respond to piracy attacks."256 
Additionally, shipping companies themselves, who may be the biggest 
victims of pirate attacks, should join in the fight against piracy by 
254. ITLOS Website, supra note 251. ITLOS has four different chambers 
adjudicating different types of disputes: the Chamber of Summary Procedure, the 
Chamber for Fisheries Disputes, the Chamber for Marine Environment Disputes, and 
the Chamber for Maritime Delimitation Disputes. 
255. Id. (noting that ITLOS has mandatory jurisdiction in cases involving 
detention and release of crews and vessels). 
256. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 42. 
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contributing financially and logistically to states' piracy-fighting 
efforts. 
1. Regi,onal cooperation between Somalia and neighboring states 
As discussed above, piracy has been almost eradicated in Southeast 
Asia through regional efforts and cooperation by the most concerned 
countries: Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia.257 The three 
countries negotiated a series of surveillance and law enforcement 
measures in order to work together on the prevention and eventual 
elimination of pirate attacks.258 Such efforts include joint maritime 
patrols, regional information sharing on piracy attacks and 
intelligence data, and joint efforts in the apprehension of pirates.259 
Other Asian countries have undertaken similar efforts, as evidenced 
by the ReCAAP Agreement.260 Moreover, similar types of cooperation 
already exist among countries fighting narco-traffickers.261 The 
United States has concluded several cooperation agreements with 
Central and Latin American countries, wherein countries have 
agreed to combine efforts to fight narco-traffickers.262 The United 
States has also initiated a partnership activity, the Proliferation 
Security Initiative, aimed at "counter[ing] the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, particularly at sea."263 Under this 
partnership, "states commit to share information and disrupt the 
transfer or transport of weapons of mass destruction in accordance 
with a set of interdiction principles."264 Similarly, central and west 
African countries established a maritime organization in 1975, and 
later, a sub-regional coast guard network for cooperation on 
suppressing piracy, terrorism at sea, illegal fishing, drug trafficking, 
fuel theft and smuggling, pipeline security, and maritime accident 
response. 265 These types of agreements represent a good model for 
the kind of cooperation needed in Somalia. Because Somalia does 
not have the capability to combat piracy alone, it should investigate 
the possibility of working with strong regional partners, such as Kenya 
257. See supra Part III.B (discussing the various types of regional cooperation). 
258. See supra Part III.B. 
259. See supra Part Ill.B. 
260. See Bradford, supra note 157, at 484 (discussing antipiracy efforts in Japan). 
261. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 49. 
262. See id. (noting the presence of nearly thirty narco-trafficking agreements, 
which oblige nations to "expedite communication on legal and jurisdictional issues 
associated with emergent countemarcotic operations at sea"). 
263. Id. 
264. Id. 
265. Id. at 51. 
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and Arabian Peninsula countries, in order to stifle the growth of 
piracy, similar to what other countries have done in the area of narco­
trafficking and the non-proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction. 
First, Somalia could look for regional partners willing to employ 
their own maritime forces to patrol the Somali coast, thereby 
preventing pirates from freely operating from Somali ports out into 
the sea. If Somali coastal towns were routinely patrolled and 
inspected, pirate operations likely would be hindered if not 
eliminated altogether.266 Somalia could request assistance from the 
same regional partners in patrolling the Gulf of Aden and areas of 
the Indian Ocean relatively close to the Somali coast or particularly 
prone to pirate attacks. The increased presence of maritime patrols 
throughout the local seas could ward off at least some pirate attacks 
as well as provide additional security to ships sailing through those 
waters. Second, Somalia could work on information and data sharing 
with its regional partners in order to best predict the likelihood of 
pirate attacks in certain waters and to identify possibly suspicious 
ships spotted by its regional partners. Information sharing, like that 
of the Southeast Asian paradigm, could significantly increase the 
probability of pirate apprehension and thereby reduce the frequency 
of pirate attacks. Third, Somalia could conclude jurisdictional 
agreements with regional partners, allowing such partners to 
prosecute apprehended pirates, to the extent that Somalia is unable 
to do so. Through a regional network of countries willing to provide 
their criminal courts as prosecution venues for apprehended pirates, 
the likelihood of pirates being released after capture due to the 
unavailability of appropriate prosecution venues would be drastically 
reduced. 
Moreover, regional agreements, such as that already in place 
between Kenya and the United Kingdom, would allow for pirate 
prosecutions regionally, providing an African solution to an African 
problem.267 This would also avoid situations such as the United 
266. Of course, Somalia would have to agree to allow regional countries into its 
own territory for patrol and inspection purposes. 
267. Diplomats have already called for an African solution to the African piracy 
crisis. See Jim Fisher-Thompson, Diplomat Says Horn of Africa Crises Require African 
Solution, AMERICA.GOV, Mar. 13, 2009, 
http://www.america.gov/st/peacesecenglish/2009/March/200903131100501ejrehsi 
F0.5235 
559.html&distid=ucs (discussing former U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia David Shinn's 
remark that "[t]he United States cannot and should not be expected to solve the 
problems of the Horn [of Africa] on its own"). Acting Assistant Secretary for Africa 
Phillip Carter has also stated that "the peace process [in Somalia] must be Somali­
owned and-led." Id. 
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States' decision to prosecute a Somali pirate in New York, which has 
been criticized as an inappropriate venue for Somali pirate 
prosecutions.268 If Somalia had a regional partnership in place with 
some of its neighbors, then most pirates would ultimately face trial 
somewhere close to Somalia. Finally, Somalia could create 
agreements with regional partners for the detention of tried pirates, 
because Somalia may simply not have enough space in its own jails. 
If pirates served their sentences under appropriate conditions in the 
prisons of willing regional partners, then major maritime powers 
apprehending pirates might have fewer qualms about delivering 
pirates to places where they could face inhumane detention 
conditions. Thus, a regional scheme of law enforcement and 
cooperation between Somalia and its neighbors could produce 
significant results in the fight against piracy. 
2. Improved maritime patrols by major maritime powers 
Major maritime powers already patrol the Gulf of Aden, but these 
patrols could do more. 269 Piracy has flourished in Somalia in part 
because of a lack of commitment by global maritime powers to 
engage in a true fight against pirates. Because piracy works at a 
supranational level, no particular country's national interests are 
threatened by any single pirate attack.270 
A great majority of pirate attacks take place against ships flying flags­
of-convenience from developing countries. In fact, ships routinely 
charter in countries like Liberia or Panama,271 which provide them 
with the friendliest business and tax laws.272 In some instances, ships 
268. Tony Karon, Why New York Is No Place to Try Somali Pirates, TIME, Apr. 21, 2009, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1892895,00.html. 
269. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 42 (noting that NATO and European 
Union countries have deployed warships to the Gulf of Aden to conduct patrols, and 
that the United Kingdom, Canadian, Turkish, German, Danish, Dutch, French, 
Pakistani, Indian, Iranian, and Russian navies have also deployed ships to the area, 
but that these patrols have had limited success). 
270. Id. at 45 ("It is typical of the vessels attacked by Somali pirates that the ship 
may be registered in one nation, such as Greece, owned by a corporation located in 
another nation, such as South Korea, and operated by a crew comprised of nationals 
of several additional countries, such as the Philippines and Pakistan. Furthermore, 
the vessel is likely to be transporting either containerized cargo or bulk commodities 
owned by companies in another country, and the piracy attack may have been 
interrupted by a warship from yet another nation."). 
271. Id. at 46. 
272. Gabel, supra note 63, at 1439 (discussing the phenomenon of flags-of­
convenience and concluding that "[t]his system also now allows shippers to hire 
cheap labor, to avoid the high cost of American crews and the burdens of stringent 
regulation, and to limit the financial consequences of any foundering or loss of a 
ship"). 
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even charter in land-locked countries, like the Central African 
Republic, because such places provide them with excellent tax 
shelters and numerous business advantages.273 Those flag-of­
convenience countries either completely lack interest in fighting 
Somali pirates, or they do not have adequate resources to do so. 274 
Major maritime powers that may have the resources to battle pirates 
may not have an incentive to do so if their own ships are not being 
attacked.275 Moreover, Somali pirates often kidnap the victim vessel's 
crewmembers, and the majority of crewmembers come from the 
developing world.276 As a result, maritime powers have little incentive 
to work toward crewmembers' release or toward the prevention of 
future hijackings because their own nationals are not held captive. 
In recent months, however, pirates have gone after ships coming 
from the developed world: a U.S. ship was attacked in April 2009; a 
British luxury yacht was overtaken in the fall of 2009; and a Spanish 
ship was captured in the fall of 2009.277 These incidents have 
captured the attention of major maritime powers, urging them to 
focus more strongly on the Gulf of Aden and other waters off the 
Somali coast. 
Maritime powers should increase their presence in the Indian 
Ocean and waters farther away from the Gulf ofAden and the Somali 
coast in order to intensify the frequency of patrols and the protection 
extended to ships sailing these treacherous waters. Some recent 
pirate attacks have occurred closer to the Seychelles and several 
hundred miles out into the Indian Ocean.278 Maritime powers should 
273. J. Ashley Roach, Former U.S. Dept. of State, Comments at ASIL Meeting, 
(Mar. 26, 2009) (discussing pirate ransoms, and calling piracy "more profitable than 
fishing"). 
274. Halberstam, supra note 76 (discussing the reticence of flag-of-convenience 
states to do anything about piracy). 
275. For example, legal and policy reasons have led some maritime powers, like 
Great Britain and Germany, to avoid capturing pirates or to release them after 
temporarily detaining them. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 22, at 56. The Netherlands 
has already released pirates without taking any legal action against them. Id. 
276. Katherine Shepherd, Legal Adviser, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
Comments at ASIL Meeting, (Mar. 26, 2009) (discussing "ship riders," which are the 
people on the hijacked ship, and how the hijacked ship HMS Cumberland contained 
Yemeni fishermen who had been held hostage by the pirates). 
277. See Azubuike, supra note 93, at 57 (discussing the Somali pirate attack on a 
U.S. ship, Maersk Alabama, in April 2009); see also Goodman, supra note 192 
(discussing a Somali pirate attack on a Spanish ship); Pirates Demand $7 million for 
Yacht Coupl£, Britain Says, CNN.COM, Oct. 31, 2009, 
http:/ /www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/10/30/yacht.pirates/index.html?iref=al 
!search (discussing a hijacking of a British luxury yacht by Somali pirates). 
278. Roach, supra note 273. 
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also increase the number of military and naval personnel present on 
board the patrolling ships, so that suspicious ships can be stopped 
and boarded, and any pirates can be detained if necessary. Finally, 
maritime powers should ensure that they have enough powerful 
weapons on board their patrolling ships, so that in case of actual 
battle with the pirates, maritime powers can defend themselves. 
Increased presence by major maritime powers throughout the waters 
of the Indian Ocean, as well as the Gulf of Aden, could contribute to 
the eradication of Somali piracy. In fact, the United States has 
already developed a comprehensive policy of diplomatic and legal 
action to fight piracy.279 The American piracy policy "emphasizes 
collaborative strategies by states and the maritime industry to prevent 
pirate attacks and other criminal acts of violence."280 Some scholars 
believe that President Obama should "accelerate efforts to partner 
with shipping states, regional coastal states, and major port states to 
create a more effective international legal and enforcement 
network. "281 
Somali piracy has flourished because Somalia is a failed state, 
unable to deal with this issue on any serious level and because most 
regional powers in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula have 
underdeveloped law enforcement and criminal systems and few 
resources to help Somalia.282 Consequently, operational and 
diplomatic partnering between Somalia, its regional partners, and the 
world's most powerful maritime countries is crucial in order to create 
a network of states interested in repressing and eradicating Somali 
piracy.283 If this law enforcement, judicial, and diplomatic partnering 
does not take place, Somali pirates will continue to benefit from 
murky jurisdictional issues and "the inherent isolation of vessels and 
nations."284 Maritime powers should focus their efforts on preventing 
this unfortunate outcome. 
3. Cost sharing structure between governments and shipping companies 
The efforts necessary to eliminate Somali piracy will entail great 
financial costs.285 Because governments of major maritime powers 
279. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 44. 
280. Id. 
281. Id. 
282. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 22, at 57-58. 
283. Id. 
284. Id. at 57. 
285. For example, several technological advances have contributed toward the 
creation of weapons for combating piracy. Some of these advances include the 
installation of electric fences on ships, the antipiracy life jacket, and satellite tracking 
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may be reluctant to expend such vast sums of money on a relatively 
isolated problem286 and because shipping companies suffer the largest 
monetary losses in this situation, shipping companies should share 
the financial burden of fighting piracy with the major maritime 
countries and their governments. 
Shipping companies could contribute specific amounts of money 
each year to naval coalitions of piracy fighting countries. Such 
resources could be used to purchase new navy ships, to equip navy 
ships with powerful weapons, and to train navy personnel in combat 
tactics. If shipping companies contributed significant amounts to 
maritime powers' governments, those governments could more easily 
justify the efforts in Somalia to their constituents by showing that the 
monetary expenditure is relatively low in piracy-fighting operations 
due to the shipping companies' donations. Shipping companies 
could, in exchange, ask for more serious protection of their ships 
sailing through the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Instead of 
paying high ransoms to the Somali pirates, thereby exacerbating the 
piracy problem,287 shippers could give the same amount of money to 
world powers and to their naval patrols and law enforcement 
operations working against the Somali pirates. A cost-sharing 
structure could improve the likelihood of improved maritime 
presence in Somalia by the world superpowers and could thereby 
reduce the frequency of pirate attacks, saving shipping companies 
considerable ransom costs. 
CONCLUSION 
The next step in fighting piracy requires a smarter approach to 
counter-piracy operations, logistics, and the legal endgame. The 
major shipping nations and regional states must develop agreements 
to enable real-time coordination for dealing with detainees, sorting 
out where they will be temporarily held, and deciding on the venue 
c . 288J.Or prosecut10n. 
Somali pirates are sea-terrorists and represent a global threat. 
Likewise, any response to such a menace should be global. Major 
devices such as ShipLoc. However, the high expenses associated with these 
technological advances continue to impede the use of these antipiracy solutions. 
Dahlvang, supra note 54, at 42-44. 
286. Carbin, supra note 19, at 55 (noting that "[t]he leading trading nations are 
evidently hesitant to take more direct measures" in the fight against Somali piracy). 
287. See id. (noting that the international shipping community's willingness to pay 
ransoms to Somali pirates ensures that "the practice will continue"). 
288. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 48. 
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maritime powers should partner with countries in the regions where 
piracy proliferates to establish law enforcement and jurisdictional 
networks to ensure that pirates are apprehended as often as possible 
and that those who are captured are always prosecuted. Counter­
piracy cooperation involving information and data sharing and joint 
maritime patrols off the Somali coast can increase the likelihood of 
pirate capture. Jurisdictional agreements among maritime powers 
and regional countries can increase the probability of prosecution, 
making at least one criminal forum available for all captured pirates. 
Finally, shipping companies themselves should contribute to the 
global fight against piracy by contributing financially and logistically 
to maritime countries already engaged in the process of eradicating 
piracy. Such a comprehensive antipiracy operation on a global scale 
is the only possible solution to the threat of Somali piracy. 
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